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Abstract
This research develops a Bayesian Abduction Model for Sensemaking Support (BAMSS) for
information fusion in sensemaking tasks. Two methods are investigated. The first is the classical
Bayesian information fusion with belief updating (using Bayesian clustering algorithm) and
abductive inference. The second method uses a Genetic Algorithm (BAMSS-GA) to search for
the k-best most probable explanation (MPE) in the network. Using various data from recent Iraq
and Afghanistan conflicts, experimental simulations were conducted to compare the methods
using posterior probability values which can be used to give insightful information for
prospective sensemaking. The inference results demonstrate the utility of BAMSS as a
computational model for sensemaking. The major results obtained are: (1) The inference results
from BAMSS-GA gave average posterior probabilities that were 103 better than those produced
by BAMSS; (2) BAMSS-GA gave more consistent posterior probabilities as measured by
variances; and (3) BAMSS was able to give an MPE while BAMSS-GA was able to identify the
optimal values for kMPEs. In the experiments, out of 20 MPEs generated by BAMSS, BAMSSGA was able to identify 7 plausible network solutions resulting in less amount of information
needed for sensemaking and reducing the inference search space by 7/20 (35%). The results
reveal that GA can be used successfully in Bayesian information fusion as a search technique to
identify those significant posterior probabilities useful for sensemaking. BAMSS-GA was also
more robust in overcoming the problem of bounded search that is a constraint to Bayesian
clustering and inference state space in BAMSS.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In the last decade, asymmetric warfare has evolved into complex multifaceted conflicts in
all the major trouble spots around the world. The conflicts have involved conventional armies of
nation states against a proliferation of non-state actors that carry out sustained insurgencies
against the superior armed forces. The end states of these insurgencies, the motivations, and
tactics vary from one insurgency to another, introducing a level of complexity into the
battlespace that requires military strategists to adopt new ways of thinking to cope with the
complexities. Often, these insurgencies are nested in complex conflicts involving third and fourth
forces (Metz, 2003) the insurgents themselves, and the regime.
Consider the most recent military conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The adversary
environment is known to be complex, “wicked” and completely asymmetric - the adversaries are
barely known, and their tactics keep changing against the coalition forces. The conventional
forces have superior weaponry, resources and manpower enabling their domination in ground
and air maneuvers, while the adversaries have the advantage of superior terrain knowledge, no
time constraints, and support from the local population making them dominant in guerilla
maneuvers. The deliberate Military Decision Making Processes (MDMP) with all their linearity
assumptions collapse immediately when they come in contact with asymmetric information
environments. Generating courses of action must be progressive and opportunistic - the usual
analytical models of judgment and choice that fit force-on-force tactics must be recalibrated to
fight unknown enemies.
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Traditionally, this kind of problem has been addressed using Boyd’s (1987) Observe,
Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) model which cognitively aligns the battle staff’s intuitive
estimates through a linear space of “Observing” the data, “Orienting,” “Deciding,” and
“Acting.” Usually mentioned anecdotally is the sensemaking aspect of the Orient stage in the
OODA (Breton & Rousseau, 2005). It is believed here that by improving the sensemaking aspect
of the OODA with analytical models, the commander’s decision making could be improved
(Munya, Trevino, & Ntuen, 2005).
A commander must draw inferences from uncertain data, identify appropriate sequences
of objectives and optimally assign resources to ensure their attainment (Thoms, 2003). In recent
decades, information has been obtained by employing sensors, data fusion and communication
systems that support inferential reduction of uncertainty in battlespaces. In the context of
asymmetric warfare, the ability of the commander to swiftly decide to counter the enemy’s
insurgent behavior puts more mental load on the staff and the commander owing to the quantity
of information to be processed. Making sense of dynamic, multivariate information to establish a
reasonable, justifiable belief about the adversary’s intent has become a hard, cognitive, analytical
problem (Ntuen, 2009).
As noted by Van Creveld (1985), there are four contextual processing regimes which
influence the commander’s decisions - the organizational, operational, informational and
inferential components. Organizationally, the commander must deal with the stratified
hierarchical nature of the military structure at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
Operationally, he must have a complete understanding of the entire theater of war and the spectra
of mapping one’s forces to counter the enemy’s plans. From an information perspective, the
commander must align the battle staff to develop the best Courses of Action (COA) estimates
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using the varied information available. Additionally, in making decisions, the commander must
be able to deal with the current situations in the field and make probabilistic inferences about the
future of the battlefield and the adversaries (Thoms, 2003).
Given the four macro-regimes of the command space, the ability of the battle staff to
develop a reasonable, but plausible rough estimate of the battle COA depends in part on their
sensemaking ability under the flux of battlespace information from the many information
generating mechanisms including humans and technology. The commander’s battle staffs,
though aided by technology, still rely on their intuition to understand the evolving situation. This
sensemaking process begins when both the commander and the staff assess the battle situation
by extrapolating their apriori knowledge onto the existing information space to understand the
ground realities.
1.2 Sensemaking
Much of the epistemological discussions of sensemaking especially the adoption of the
sensemaking construct and its impact on research paradigms, theory, and methodology, has
occurred in the social and management circles (Weick, 1995) which have yielded most of the
definitions of sensemaking. Weick defines sensemaking as a process involving identity,
retrospect, enactment, social contact, ongoing events, cues and plausibility (1995). Huber (1991)
introduces the concept of “active agents” capable of constructing sensible and sensable events.
From information fusion discipline, sensemaking involves putting stimuli into some kind
of framework (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988).When people put stimuli into frameworks, this
enables them to “comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate and predict.”
Sensemaking is also viewed as a thinking process that uses retrospective accounts to explain
surprises (Louis, 1980).Thomas, Clark and Gioa describe sensemaking as the “reciprocal
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interaction of information seeking, meaning ascription and action” (1993, p.240). Sackman
(1991) talks about sensemaking mechanisms that organizational members use to attribute
meaning to events, mechanisms that include the standards and rules for perceiving, interpreting,
believing and acting that are typically used in a given cultural setting (p.33). Feldman and March
(1988) define sensemaking as an interpretive process that is necessary for “organizational
members to understand and to share understandings about such features of the organization as
what it is about, what it does well and poorly, what the problems it faces are and how it should
resolve them.” Ring and Rands (1989) define sensemaking as a “process in which individuals
develop cognitive maps of their environments” (p.342). In military circles, sensemaking is
defined as a multidimensional process of developing an operational understanding and awareness
within a complex and evolving task domain (Leedom, 2004).
These definitions point to sensemaking as a concept, a process or even a structural
framework. Conceptually, sensemaking is presented in terms of principles and theories (Ntuen,
2006). By general definition, a principle refers to an assumption, a basic truth, or law that must
hold for an entity to be accepted as such in the field of research. As a process, sensemaking is
defined in terms of situated (contextual) actions, informational or symbolic level of processing,
and cognitive information processing that is mainly tacit knowledge explication. As a structural
framework, sensemaking can be viewed as an ontological link of information from individuals or
organizations for the purpose of discovering intrinsic values for decision making.
Ntuen, Park, and Kim (2013) note that information is the heart of the sensemaking
process. In cases where the required information may be completely missing, the sensemaking
process starts with making guesses using retrospective knowledge. The information may be
incomplete, in which case the sense-maker becomes an intuitive statistician, mentally estimating
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and connecting dots. Finally, information may be overwhelmingly too much. For example, in
military command and control centers, there is a multitude of sensor devices generating
information in real-time.
Relevant to knowledge management, Ntuen, Park, and Kim (2013) further observed three
major characteristics of sensemaking:
(a). Sensemaking is an aspect of information foraging: Pirolli and Card (1999) define the
Information Foraging Theory as an approach to understanding how strategies and technologies
for information seeking, gathering, and consumption are adapted to the flux of information in the
environment. The theory assumes that people, when possible, will modify their strategies or the
structure of the environment to maximize absorption of valuable information. Pirolli and Card
(2005) note that foraging tasks consist of information gathering, representation of the
information in a schema that aids analyses, the development of insight through the manipulation
of this representation, and the creation of some knowledge product or direct action based on the
insight.
(b). Sensemaking is an information fusion tool: Sensemaking is viewed as a thinking
process that uses retrospective accounts to explain surprises (Louis, 1980, p.241), and uses new
information to update prospective states of a situation. Previously, Munya and Ntuen (2007)
have used this axiom to develop an Information Fusion Model using Bayesian Information
Updating.
(c ). Sensemaking supports situation understanding: The overarching goal of
sensemaking as noted by Starbuck and Miliken (1988) is information interpretation through the
process whereby stimuli is placed into some kind of framework as a consequence of which, the
situation is understood. Comprehending the situation supports better judgments, decisions and
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actions. Klein (2006) describes sensemaking as the set of processes involved in trying to improve
an individual’s understanding of a situation, often in response to surprise. Malhotra (2001) notes
that by understanding a situation, we can conceptually link available information and the
expected result or the anticipation of task outcomes. It helps us understand the gap between
performance expectations based on information in context (Malhotra, 2001; pp. 120).
1.3 Challenges in Fusing Information from Asymmetric Battlespace to Support
Sensemaking
In the asymmetric battlespace environments, the deliberate MDMP with all their linearity
assumptions are generally deemed inadequate. COA generated must be progressive and
opportunistic rather than contextual and analytical. While contextual and analytical models of
judgment and choice fit force-on-force tactics, they are much less adaptable to asymmetric
battlespaces. Sensemaking for asymmetric battlespace information management has been
advocated by Bodnar (2005); Leedom (2004, 2005); Leedom and Eggleston (2005); Ntuen
(2006, 2008); Klein (2006), and Good et al., (2004). Even among these researchers’, there is a
consensus that sensemaking is anecdotal and prescriptive because it is governed by expert
judgment and experience.
There are also many problems and gaps in the literature with respect to developing
analytical models to capture sensemaking. These gaps are enumerated and described below:
(a). Asymmetric information is generally characterized with equivocation, different types of
uncertainties, ambiguities and surprises, emerging and evolving information, and complexities,
among others.
(b). There is a problem of scale related to information complexity in military command and
control (C2) organizations. For example, there are challenges in applying closed-form
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mathematical models such as Bayesian Models to a battlespace system even at the brigade and
lower levels mostly due to the information-handling costs.
(c). Most analytical models lack the robustness to deal with sensemaking problems arising from
non-crisp information.
(d) Lack of cognitive architectures that support the ability to fuse core knowledge and use such
knowledge in performing meta-reasoning with the available information in novel situations. Core
knowledge, serves as apriori information to a decision maker and is a key sensemaking input.
Given the above challenges, some critical issues giving impetus to this research can be
identified for the analytical modeling of the sensemaking process as:


Development of a framework that can computationally represent sensemaking with
all its tacit dimensions of knowledge as a model of human cognition.



A reasoning construct supported by Bayes Theorem that can support the
sensemaking process. Bayesian Networks are propositional in nature and have
inherent limitations in their expressive powers.



Development of an architecture that can sufficiently combine and represent the
expressive nature of Bayesian Networks with the ability to handle multiple types of
uncertain information while increasing information entropy.

1.4 Research Goals and Objectives
This research aims to develop a Bayesian Abduction Model for Sensemaking Support
(BAMSS). The application domain is for the analysis of military Courses of Action. The research
objectives are broadly defined as:
1. To develop a sensemaking analytical model to support military commanders in
integrating information from various sources in asymmetric battlespace. The modeling

9
process is centered on using a Bayesian Network to represent causal relationships among
the decision variables and perform abduction reasoning to get the most explainable
causes.
2. To validate a prototype BAMSS using case situations from asymmetric warfare.
3. To improve and optimize the BAMSS output by using a genetic algorithm to seed the
relevant Bayesian data.
1.5 Intellectual and Broader Impact Contribution
The research demonstrates the development of a sensemaking analytical model using a
Bayesian Network. Bayesian Networks are used as knowledge representation and analysis tools.
A Bayesian Network was chosen because of its robustness to make abduction inference - typical
of sensemaking in that it looks for the most probable cause-effect relations within the
information. It is believed that Bayesian algorithms will enable real-time information fusion, thus
easing the process of sensemaking, especially, testing multiple competing hypotheses from a
domain-specific large database. We also demonstrate that the model is robust and scalable and
can be applied to many different situations that require information fusion.

1.6 Chapter Summary and Thesis Overview
Chapter 1 introduces the research topic, the problem statement, the research goals and
objectives, the challenges encountered in the research and the general contribution to the
scientific body of knowledge. Chapter 2 discusses the contextual framework of sensemaking
analytics. Chapter 3 presents the Bayesian formalism as a mathematical model for knowledge
representation in a sensemaking context. A discussion of abductive inference for BAMSS is also
presented. Chapter 4 presents the BAMSS information and functional architecture, the
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computational platform requirements (software and hardware), sample computational algorithms,
and sample case vignettes. Chapter 5 extends the discussion of the BAMSS model by
incorporating a Genetic Algorithm to improve and optimize the output. Chapter 6 presents the
research summary, observations, conclusions, and recommendations for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
Sensemaking Analytics
2.1 Contextual Framing
Analytical models of sensemaking focus mainly on the micro cognitive aspects of
sensemaking at the individual level. The underlying theme is to isolate and represent aspects of
cognition that humans rely on to understand events in uncertain environments. The dominant
rubric in the development of these models has been to fashion them like linear decision support
systems whose output is almost always linear. Such systems take the black box approach to the
problem of sensemaking assuming that any number of inputs to the system can be processed by
some algorithm to produce the right output. This works well if we are to assume a deterministic
situation. The reality is that sensemaking is used for situations that are dynamic and complex
with nonlinear behaviors.
Models for sensemaking analytics should consider uncertainty, contradiction, ambiguity,
time-based behaviors, and indeterminacy which extend beyond the deterministic models.
Anecdotally, the Think Loop Model (Bodnar, 2005) exemplifies these sensemaking
characteristics by breaking down the analytical process into a nested series of “think loops”
which indicate how analysts combine “bottom-up” data with “top-down” data to derive useful
information. Leedom and Eggleston (2005) described a working simulation model of human
sensemaking and decision-making within a future joint or coalition military Command, Control,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) system. Their sensemaking framework
uniquely integrated two areas of modeling; i) explicit representation of the knowledge
framework (abstraction hierarchy) required for decomposing command intent into actionable
knowledge within each of the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and
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Infrastructure (PMESII) dimensions of the battlespace and ii) explicit representation of the staff
work flow and patterns of collaboration within the various centers, working groups, cells, and
teams that build this knowledge framework.
Other analytic models of sensemaking examine the cognitive and external resource cost
of sensemaking (e.g. by Russell, Stefik, Pirolli, & Card, 1993), the effects of tools on the
behavior of people doing rapid large-volume data assessment (Russell, Slaney, Qu, & Houston,
2005), rapid understanding of large document collection (Russell &Slaney, 2004) and visual
sensemaking (Chi & Card, 1999; Card, 2004; Russell, 2003). The next section examines
different approaches to qualitative models of sensemaking.
2.2 Qualitative Models of Sensemaking
Several qualitative models have been proposed for sensemaking analyses. However, a
unifying paradigm for sensemaking is currently lacking. Additionally, there is no general
consensus as to how the sensemaking process might be operationally defined, analytically
modeled, empirically tested, and critically assessed in terms of key constructs and variables,
process interactions and obstacles, performance dimensions and metrics, and objective criteria
for assessing the adequacy or sufficiency of outcome (Leedom, 2004).These models have been
tailored to suit different domains ranging from Mission Command situations to business
decision- making .
The OODA model was developed by Boyd and is commonly applied to military
command and control decision-making situations. In the OODA model, the Orient phase
attempts to capture the cognitive processes involved in sensemaking. A modified version of the
model, the Cognitive-OODA (Breton & Rousseau, 2005), was developed in response to the
military adoption of the Effects Based Operations (EBO) which emphasizes analytical rather
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than conventional tactics. Endsley’s Model of Situation Awareness (1995) closely mirrors the
sensemaking process mostly at the level II Situation Awareness (SA). At level II SA,
sensemaking represents the comprehension of information (transformation of information to
knowledge).
Wiig (2002) describes sensemaking as a continuous integration of evolving situationhandling activities that are based on cognitive constructs. The model assumes that an individual’s
sensemaking process is based on four types of mental models: the Situation Recognition Model,
the Decision-Making and Problem Solving Model, the Execution Method Model and the
Governance Approach Models. In Shattuck and Millers’ Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition
(2004), sensemaking is viewed as a sequence of situated acts. Situated action models emphasize
the emergent, contingent nature of human activity, and the way it grows directly out of the
particularities of a given situation. A central tenet of the situated action approach is that the
structuring of activity is not something that precedes it but only grows directly from the
immediacy of the situation (Lave &Wenger, 1991).
Klein’s (2004) Data/Frame Analytical Model focuses on the micro-cognitive aspects of
individual sensemaking. Framing indicates how we structure problems into a particular set of
beliefs and perspectives that constrain data collection and analysis. The Plan as You Execute
(PAYE) model (Ntuen, 2006), was developed as a hybrid model incorporating a variety of the
cognitive models discussed above. The model architecture is dependent on schema -based
knowledge representation about the world, a question answering (Q-A) sensemaking query
system, reflexive and reflective cognition models and the dynamic cognitive scripts or metacognition knowledge elements.
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The non-linearity and complexity of the asymmetric battlespace has been analyzed using
Complex Adaptive Systems Theory. Kilcullen (2004) defines the asymmetric battlespace as an
open and complex adaptive system characterized by the non-linear interaction of its subordinate
elements. Comprised of many dynamically interacting subcomponents, complex adaptive
systems exhibit coherent behavior despite their highly dispersed and decentralized control
structure (Kilcullen, 2004).
The complexity of asymmetric warfare has also been researched by a number of
researchers (Ryan, 2008; Bar-Yam, 2004; Kilcullen, 2004). Ryan uses the Law of Multiscale
Variety (Bar-Yam, 2004) to discuss two complex systems ideas (multiscale variety and
adaptation) that underpin our understanding of asymmetric warfare. For a system with N parts
that must be coordinated to respond to the external contexts, the scale of the response is given by
the number of parts that participate in the coordinated response. Second, we assume that under
(complete) coordination, the variety of the coordinated parts equals the variety of a single part.
The induced sensemaking process is interpreted to operate on the same axiom of Law of
Multiscale Variety—where information is subject to serious uncertainties and equally N-order
entropy. The generalized Law of Multiscale Variety states that at every scale, the variety
necessary to meet the tasks, at that scale, must be larger for the system than the task
requirements.
The Cynefin Model (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003) emphasizes the effect of problem type and
environment on the sensemaking and decision-making capabilities. The novelty of this model
lies in its approach to problem-solving in a realm that encompasses all problematic situations.
Combining Ryan’s concept of multiscale variety and adaptation with this model of sensemaking,
we argue that the context of MDMP in asymmetric battlespace spans both the knowable space
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and the complex space. In the knowable space, also called complicated order or Realm of
Scientific Inquiry, cause and effect relationships are generally understood, but for any specific
decision it is imperative to gather and analyze further data to predict the consequences of a COA
without any uncertainty. Snowden characterizes decision making in this space as {SENSE,
ANALYZE and RESPOND}. Decision analysis and support require accurate fitting and use of
models to forecast the consequences of actions with appropriate levels of uncertainty (French,
2013)

Figure 1. Cynefin Model. Adapted from Kurtz and Snowden, 2003.
In the complex space, also called the complex unorder or the Realm of Social Systems,
decision-making situations involve many interacting causes and effects. Knowledge in this space
is at best qualitative: there are too many potential interactions to disentangle particular causes
and effects. There are no precise quantitative models to predict system behaviors as seen in
known and knowable spaces. Decision-making is more focused on exploring judgment and issues
and on developing broad strategies that are sufficiently flexible to accommodate evolving
situations. Snowden suggests that in these circumstances, decision making is more of the form
{PROBE, SENSE and RESPOND} (French, 2013). Analysis begins with informal qualitative
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models. If quantitative models are used, then they are simple, perhaps linear multi-attribute value
models (Belton & Stewart, 2002).
Bodnar (2005) developed a Think Loop Model (TLM) for sensemaking analysis that
breaks the analytical process down into a nested series of “think loops” which indicate how
analysts combine “bottom-up” data-driven steps with “top-down” hypotheses-driven steps to be
able to forage through new data, and then synthesize that data into evidence-based schemas and
theories. The TLM process considers many back loops within a sensemaking component cycle
by using one set of activities that cycle around finding information and another that cycle around
making sense of the information, with multiple interactions between them. Additionally, the
upward processes fall into a single overall scheme for data-driven analysis while the downward
arrows fall into a single overall scheme for hypotheses-driven analysis.
Russell, et al., (1993) developed the Sensemaking Thinking Loop (STL) as a continuous
evolving state of reasoning about a problem context. The STL has three main processes, namely,
search for representation, instantiating representation, and shifting representation, respectively.
Searching for representations is designed to capture salient features of the data in a way that
supports the use of the instantiated representation. Instantiating a representation identifies
information of interest and encodes it in a representation that emerges from the generation loop.
The instantiated schemas called encodons are created in the data coverage loop. Shift
representation is designed to cope with contextual information changes and entails forcing a
change in the representation via a bottom-up or data-driven process.
A diversity of efforts exists within the sensemaking community of practice. Therefore,
Buckingham-Shum and Selvin (1999) note that, “there are not only gaps in the languages, frames
of reference, and belief systems that people in the different communities of practice have, but
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also gaps between their respective sensemaking efforts - their concepts in the representational
situation. In many cases, different communities have mutually unintelligible sensemaking
efforts, leading to mutually unintelligible representational effort.”
2.3 Sensemaking Analytics Tools
The major difference between a Sensemaking Support System (S3) and a Decision
Support System (DSS) is that S3 supports sensemaking activities, while DSS supports decision
making activities. DSS has matured in its constructs and theories, and is usually designed to help
an agent choose from the multiple options. S3s are relatively nascent and universally lack
acceptable theoretical frameworks and constructs. An S3 will usually target problems in
information foraging, diagnosis, information fusion, and help the sense-maker understand the
specific problem situation.
The S3 is a product developed by Ntuen, Park, and Kim (2013) as a tool for information
fusion during sensemaking within a military domain. S3 provides the backbone for developing a
collaborative decision support system since it is designed for multiple users engaged in
collaborative sensemaking. The tasks are defined at different strata of operational doctrines. The
user can use maps, whiteboards, annotations, and graphics to illustrate facts or clarify arguments.
The display model is implemented using the stages of the cognitive abstraction hierarchy which
maps the requirements of sensemaking stages (Figure 2). S3 enables the users to develop and
frame the hypotheses, analyze the hypotheses in the experimental domain, and provide cases for
simulation experiments. The visualization and sensemaking support module in S3 provides a
user interface and visualization support.
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Figure 2. Visual analytics screen capture in S3
Good and his colleagues from PARC AI group (2004) developed the ACH0 as an
experimental program intended to aid intelligence analysis in sensemaking. ACH 0 is a tableoriented workspace for performing the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). By
accommodating multiple explicit hypotheses and systematic consideration of available evidence,
the ACH method counteracts confirmation bias and other causes of inaccuracies. ACH0 provides
two simple algorithms for scoring evidence: an Inconsistency Counting Algorithm and a
Normalized Algorithm. Both of these are intended only as rough guides for scoring hypotheses.
The algorithms operate on the same data, but make different trade-offs.
Figure 3, a screen shot of ACH0, illustrates its table format. The hypotheses under
consideration in the example are the columns labeled H1, H2, and H3. Six items of evidence are
present in the example in the rows labeled E1 through E6. In the ACH Method, each piece of
evidence is assumed to be independent and the hypotheses are exhaustive and mutually
exclusive. In Figure 3 an entry of “I” signals that this evidence is inconsistent with the
corresponding hypothesis, and entry of “II” signals that it is very inconsistent with the evidence.
The “C” and “CC” entries indicate two levels of consistency. Similarly, ACH 0 provides three
levels of weight assigned to evidence. Roughly, this weight is a stand-in for a richer
representation of the evidence quality.
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Figure 3. ACH0 interface table (Good et al., 2004)
More recently, Lebiere et al., (2013) presented a computational cognitive model,
developed in the ACT-R architecture of several core information-foraging and hypothesesupdating processes involved in a complex sensemaking task. In the context of an intelligence
task analysis, the authors view sensemaking as the act of finding and interpreting relevant facts
amongst the sea of incoming reports, images, and intelligence. They describe the computational
module as an “explicit, unified, mechanistic and theoretical framework for cognitive biases that
provides a computational understanding of the conditions under which such biases occur.”
Using the Cognitive Architecture Model they provide a functional bridge from the
qualitative theories of sensemaking to detailed neural models of brain functions. Testing the
model entailed performance of experimental tasks using a task modeling approach for different
sets of scenarios and human participants. The quantitative prediction of a number of cognitive
biases by the model was then recorded and analyzed on a trial-to-trial basis. The model correctly
predicted the presence and degree of four biases: confirmation, anchoring and adjustment,
representativeness, and probability matching.

20
While there is a growing interest in sensemaking analytics, it is important to discuss the
histories behind them. Among the first sensemaking support tools developed is the gIBIS
(Conklin & Begeman, 1988). The gIBIS describes an application-specific hypertext system
designed to capture early design deliberations. It implements a specific method, called Issue
Based Information Systems (IBIS), which has been developed for use on large, complex design
problems. An improvement on gIBIS is Compendium (Shum & Selvin, 1999), a software tool
providing a flexible visual interface for managing the connections between information and
ideas.
The Sensemaking Support Environment by Eggleston, Bearavolu, and Mostashfi (2005)
is a tool developed to augment an intelligence analyst’s cognitive capabilities. Similarly Sticha,
Buede, and Rees (2005) have developed APOLLO, a software application that enables the
analyst to reason through a prediction of a subject’s decision making, to identify assumptions
and determinant variables, and to quantify each variable’s relative contribution to the prediction,
by producing a graphical representation of the analysis with explicit levels of uncertainty.
CoSen (Furnas, Qu, &Sharma 2003) provides an integrated workspace for information
gathering and sensemaking. It examines sensemaking activities across different levels of social
aggregation and focuses on technological support of representations for sensemaking to improve
knowledge enhancement in the context of information sourced from the web. A user with a
sensemaking task searches the information on the web and organizes it into a hierarchical tree
structure.
DECIDE (Cluxton & Eick, 2005) is an analytical engine for hypothesizing and
visualizing structured arguments. The tool enables analysts to construct arguments, associate
evidence with conjectures, sub-hypotheses, and hypotheses, set evidence credibility and
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relevance, and score the arguments. WORKING BY WIRE (Gundry & Metes, 1996) is a
software program that equips distributed team members to “work together apart”. Going beyond
the usual level of tool skills, WORKING BY WIRE addresses the behaviors, methods,
approaches and protocols required to support distributed team work. A similar approach to
sensemaking is seen in Livenet (Rura-Polley, Hawryszkiewycz, & Baker, 2000). DISCOVER
(Milligan & Ahmed, 2005) and Battlesense (Klein, Long, Hutton, & Shafer 2004) have been
developed specifically to support sensemaking in the battlefield environment.
COLAB (Morrison & Cohen, 2005) is a laboratory for studying tools that facilitate
collaboration and sensemaking among groups of human analysts as they interpret unfolding
situations based on accruing intelligence data. The laboratory has three components. The Hats
Simulator provides a challenging problem domain involving thousands to millions of agents
engaged in individual and collective behaviors, a small portion of which are terrorists. The
second component, the AIID Bayesian Blackboard, is an instrumented working environment
within which, analysts collaborate to interpret the problem domain. The third component is a
web-based user interface that integrates the Trellis hypothesis authoring and management tool
with a query language to allow human analysts to interact with AIID and each other.
Collaboration Envelope (Nosek, 2005) follows a similar approach. In particular Collaboration
Envelope develops architectures that support individual and group sensemaking.
SSIGS (Qu, 2003) is a sensemaking-supporting information gathering system whose
workspace offers features that not only facilitate information search but also, a representation
search and representation shift that are crucial for sensemaking tasks. ClaimSpotter (Sereno,
Shum, & Motta, 2004) is a text-driven interface that facilitates the creation of argument maps
expressing, for instance, the position of multiple annotators over a particular problem. Such
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concept maps could be used to represent the perspective taken on a domain, according to the
different annotators (and potentially authors) of the documents being connected. A critical look
at the tools developed points to the gradual shift from decision support tools to sensemaking
support tools. The latter focuses on augmenting the cognitive capability of the sensemaker during
the whole process of sensemaking.
2.4 Chapter Summary
Chapter two reviews both, the qualitative and the analytical models of sensemaking.
From qualitative analyses, most researchers focus on cognition where the primary sensemaking
task is to construct a meaningful mental representation of the problem space. Schema-driven
representation, mental models, and other cognitive constructs dominate the process models of
sensemaking that are discussed. These models give an understanding of the meta-cognitive and
cognitive acts that inform the sensemaking process and how they may be applied to understand
and overcome the cognitive limitations of the human mind. The limitations of this approach lie
primarily in the lack of a unifying paradigm of sensemaking. An additional challenge exists in
the way this information may be used to develop a unifying framework or standardized guidance
for the development of better sensemaking support systems.
Research on sensemaking analytics is presented as a tool to support the sensemaking
process. In this approach, sensemaking models are defined as computational cognitive models
whose primary task is to enable processing of information to achieve an understanding of the
problem space and facilitate effective analysis process. Most of the models discussed have been
developed for the fields of intelligence analysis, information foraging and knowledge
management. The tools developed indicate a gradual shift from decision support tools to
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sensemaking support tools which focus on augmenting the cognitive capability of the
sensemaker during the whole process of sensemaking.
This research uses the tool-based approach to model the sensemaking process for two
reasons: First, the advances in Computational Intelligence have led to the development of
powerful and efficient algorithms and methods that can be used to computationally simulate
some processes in sensemaking. For example, it is possible to represent sensemaking models in
software and cognitive architectures. The algorithms also enable better user interaction with the
models, thus simplifying the process of task performance and analysis in scenarios where
sensemaking is required. Second, through the use of computational techniques such as Bayesian
Networks and Abductive Inference, both the qualitative and quantitative approaches can be
combined to provide a better representation of the sensemaking process.

24
CHAPTER 3
Bayesian Models for Sensemaking
3.1 Bayes Theory and Abductive Inference
Any situation in which we have to make decisions often necessitates hypothesizing from
a sample space H, given some observed data D. Bayes Theorem provides a way of calculating
the probability of a hypothesis based on its prior probability, the probabilities of observing
various data given the hypothesis and the observed data itself. To define Bayes Theorem
precisely, we first need to define the notations used. Let P(h) denote the initial probability that
hypothesis h holds, before we incorporate any new data. P(h) is the prior probability of h and
may reflect any background knowledge we have about the chance that h is a correct hypothesis.
If no such prior knowledge exists, let P(D) denote the probability that evidence data D will be
observed. P(D) represents the probability of evidence D given no knowledge about which
hypothesis holds. Let P(D|h) denote the probability of observing data D given a situation where
hypothesis h holds. We are interested in the probability P(h|D) that h holds given the observed
data D. P(h|D) is called the posterior probability of h because it reflects our confidence that h
holds after we have seen some evidence D.
Bayes Theorem provides a way to calculate the posterior probability P(h|D), from prior
probability P(h),together with P(D) and P(D|h). This is mathematically stated as,

P( h | D) 

P ( D | h) P ( h)
P( D)

(1)

In this formalism, propositions are given numerical parameters signifying the degree of belief
accorded to them under some body of knowledge, and the parameters are combined and
manipulated according to the rules of the Probability Theory. For example, if h stands for the
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statement “ An attack on the subway is imminent ”, then P(h|w) stands for an individuals’
subjective belief in h given a body of knowledge w, which might include that in the individuals
assumptions about security in the city, specific threats were made by terror groups along with an
assessment of the threat level.
In defining belief expressions, it is common to denote P(h) or P(h), leaving out the
constant w. This abbreviation is justified when w remains constant, since the main purpose of the
quantifier P is to summarize w without explicating it. In situations where background
information undergoes changes, there is a need to specifically identify the assumptions that
account for our beliefs and articulate explicitly w or some of its elements. In Bayesian
Formalism, belief measures obey the three basic axioms of Probability Theory:


0 P (A)  1



P(Certain proposition) = 1



P(A or B) = P(A) +P(B) if A and B are mutually exclusive.

The third axiom states that the belief assigned to any set of events is the sum of the beliefs
assigned to its nonintersecting components.
The basic expressions in the Bayesian formalism are statements about conditional
probabilities, for example, P (A|B) - which specify the belief in A under the assumption that B is
known with absolute certainty. A and B are independent if P(A|B) =P(A). If P(A|B,C) =P(A|C)
then A and B are conditionally independent given C. Bayesian philosophers see the conditional
relationship as more compatible with the organization of human knowledge. In this view, B
serves as a pointer to a context of the frame of knowledge, and A|B stands for an event A in the
context specified by B. Thus factual knowledge invariably is encoded in conditional probability
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statements, while belief in joint events, if it is ever needed is computed from those statements via
the product rule:
P(A,B)=P(A|B)P(B)

(2)

The probability of any event A can be computed by conditioning it on any set of
exhaustive and mutually exclusive events Bi, i=1,2…,n:

P( A)   P( A | Bi ) P( Bi )
i

(3)

This decomposition provides the basis for hypothetical or assumption-based reasoning in the
Bayesian Formalism. It states that the belief in any event A is a weighted sum over the beliefs in
all the distinct ways that A might be realized.
3.2 Related Sample Applications of Bayesian Networks in the Military Domains
Dynamic Bayesian Networks (Pearl, 1988; Pfeffer, 2000) have been used for military
plan recognition. The translation of context independent (sensor) data to context dependent data
(information) with respect to knowledge incompleteness has been successfully implemented with
context-based navigation of troops (Su, Bai, Du, & Feng, 2011). The task of tactical engagement
of entity agents is described by means of a Behavior Definition Frame and task allocation entails
using a Task Allocation Processing Bayesian Network Module (Li et al., 2010)
Johansson and Falkman (2008) have used Bayesian Networks (BNs) and a ground target
simulator to predict enemy intent for battle command. Expert elicitation was used to identify
general parameters to predict the enemy’s tactical intention in different ground combat scenarios.
Such parameters include enemy intention, distance between the enemy and different targets,
enemy type and target type, direction, targets protection value, and attraction.
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Suzic (2003) used dynamic belief networks as a method for representing knowledge
about the enemy and performing inference based on sensor data. In this case, the BN was used to
solve a dynamic, stochastic policy recognition problem with the task characterized a s “an online multi-agent stochastic policy recognition.” It aimed at detecting the policies an agent or a
group of agents would execute by observing their actions and using apriori knowledge about
them in a noisy environment. Inferencing was undertaken to derive belief measures for the
enemy plans.
The BN is presented as a hierarchical model of a hostile tank company consisting of three
tank platoons with each platoon containing three tanks as shown in Figure 4. For each level there
is a certain set of policies invoked by the higher level. The simplest policies, their atoms, consist
only of a set of actions.

Figure 4. A BN representing the policy hierarchy model of a hostile company (Suzic, 2003),
redrawn.
In this instance, the policy for each agent (hostile unit) is represented as a BN node with the
simplest policy being on the tank (group) level, k=0. The variable π0,i represents Tank i’s policy
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variable with various discrete states that define directional movement (π 0,i,), policy of the tank
platoon; (π 1,i) and policy of the tank company (π 2,i). The network is then used to predict
opponents behaviors based on observations, knowledge about the opponents’ doctrines and
terrain data.
Das (1999) describes the use of BNs to represent and update uncertainties encountered in
the process of situation assessment using scenarios in naval anti-surface warfare. A set of
hypotheses that adequately represent possible enemy intentions is generated with clarifying states
- Passive, Defensive, Offensive and Not Modelled. Enemy intention directly influences enemy
activity which may be Logistics, Reconnaissance of a restricted zone, Mounting naval attack,
Enemy vessel type, Position of the enemy unit, Mobility of the enemy unit or Communication
activities of the enemy unit.
Figure 5 shows the BN developed for situation assessment in a naval anti-surface
warfare. Evidence to the network is supplied through the sensor and reconnaissance nodes. The
network uses the evidence to update the probability distribution over the states of the position
node. The parameters: vessel type, position and mobility are also detected through sensors and
reconnaissance.
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Figure 5. A BN for situational assessment in naval-anti-surface warfare (Das, 1999).
Santos (2003) used BNs to develop an adversary model that could capture goals,
intentions, biases, beliefs and perceptions based on a dynamic cognitive architecture that evolved
over time. The basic adversary intent architecture comprised three core components: Goals/Foci,
Rationale and Action. The Goal component was a probabilistically prioritized short- and longterm goal list representing adversary intents, objectives or foci. The Rationale component was a
probabilistic network representing what influences the adversary’s beliefs, about himself, the
Blue Forces, their goals, and certain high level actions associated with these goals. The Actions
component was a probabilistic network, representing the detailed relationships between
adversary goals and the actions they were likely to perform to realize them.
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Bayesian Networks were developed for the Rationale and Action networks. Each random
variable in the network was classified into one of four classes: axioms, beliefs, goals and actions.
Adversary axioms represented the underlying beliefs of the adversary about himself and served
as inputs or explanations to the other random variables. Adversary beliefs represented the
adversary’s beliefs regarding the Blue Forces. Adversary goals represented the goals or desired
end-states of the adversary. Adversary actions represented the actions of the adversary that
could typically be observed by friendly forces.
A computational framework for adversarial modeling and inferencing of adversary intent
was developed as part of the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace (Bell, Santos, & Brown, 2002). Bayesian Networks and Bayesian Knowledge Bases
were implemented in an adversary Intent Inferencing Module for COA prediction, explanation
and inference of adversary intent. Simulation and proof-of-concept used scenarios from the battle
of al Khafji - during the Operation Desert Storm. This simulation included a stream of direct
enemy observables as they unfolded in the battlefield. The initial intent of the adversary (not to
attack across the Saudi border into al Khafji) was known apriori. As the situation unfolded in the
simulation, the adversary model evolved the underlying intent dynamically based on the
observables and predicted enemy actions in accordance with the actions taken during the battle.
With this simulation, the authors were able to demonstrate the viability of probabilistic network
modeling approach to capturing such scenarios.
Falzon and Priest (2004) used Bayesian Networks in the development of the Center of
Gravity (COG) Network Effects Tool (COGNET). COGNET provides a modeling framework
and a generic database to aid knowledge reuse and knowledge transfer. The modeling
framework is then used as a basis for the construction, population and analysis of Bayesian
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Networks to support a rigorous and systematic approach to the COG analysis. The BN developed
is a causal probabilistic network that represents the functional decomposition of the key concepts
used by operational planners in COA development: end-state, center of gravity, critical
vulnerabilities, decisive points and lines of operations.
Evans et al., (2003) used Dynamic Bayesian Nets to represent the causal relationship
between lower-level friendly tasks and higher-level effects on adversary systems in order to
guide plan generation and analyze the observed impact of planned military actions during plan
execution. Pate-Cornell (2002) used a BN in intelligence analysis within tactical situations by
developing a probabilistic method of assessing the intent and location of terrorists, their weapons
and other enablers, as input to “local risk” analyses, in support of risk management decisions in
the context of an unfolding crisis. McLaughlin and Pate-Cornell (2005) used Bayesian
techniques to analytically illustrate Iraq’s nuclear program intelligence.
3.3 Abduction in Bayesian Belief Networks
3.3.1 Abduction as the Most Probable Explanation (MPE) of Events
Gelsema (1995) notes that “a special class of problems in Bayesian belief networks is
abductive reasoning, inference from effects to the best explanations of the effects.” Similarly,
Lacave and Diez (2002) note that explanations of evidence consist of determining which values
of the unobserved variables justify the available evidence. This process is usually called
abduction, and is based on the (usually implicit) assumption that there is a causal model. In this
context, an explanation is a configuration of the unobserved variables, and the goal of the
inference process is to obtain the Most Probable Explanation (MPE) or the k Most Probable
Explanations (kMPEs). In general, the variables that take the value “present” or “positive” in the
MPE are considered the causes that explain the evidence. This kind of explanation is basically to
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offer a diagnosis for a set of observed anomalies. For instance, in medical expert systems, an
explanation determines the disease or diseases that explain the evidence: symptoms, signs, test
results, etc.
Lacave and Diez (2002), consider an explanation w which is an assignment of values to
all the variables in a certain subset W of the variables of the network. Since the values of
observed variables are known with certainty, only unobserved variables are the object of scrutiny
in abductive methods. Abduction intends to find the MPE with the configuration w with the
maximum a-posteriori probability P (w| e), where e is the available evidence. When W includes
all the unobserved variables, the process is known as total abduction; else, it is partial abduction.
In general, given an observation o, a hypothesis h and the knowledge that h causes o, it is an
abduction to hypothesize that h occurred. Abduction tries to synthesize a composite hypothesis
explaining the entire observation from elementary hypotheses.
Pierce (1877) first described abductive inference by providing two intuitive
characterizations: given an observation d and the knowledge that h causes d, it is an abduction to
hypothesize that h occurred; and given a proposition q and the knowledge that pq, it is an
abduction to conclude p. In either case, abduction is uncertain because something else might be
the actual cause of d, or because the reasoning pattern is the classical fallacy of “affirming the
consequent” and therefore, formally invalid. Additional difficulties can exist because h might not
always cause d, or because p might imply q only by default. Generally, we can say that h
explains d and p explains q and we shall refer to h and p as hypotheses and d and q as data.
Peirce (1877) further defines the process of inquiry or discovery as including three fundamental
inference processes:
1) Abduction generates hypotheses to explain new anomalous data.
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2) Deduction performs the function of making a prediction as to what would occur if the
hypotheses were to turn out to be the case.
3) Induction finds the ratio of the frequency by which the necessary results of deduction do in
fact occur.
Abduction is then, a reasoning process that forms plausible explanations for abnormal
observations. It is distinct from deduction and induction in that it is inherently uncertain since
information or data supporting the abduction process is dynamic, leading to human construction
of multiple and often competing hypotheses. It takes as input a set of data and yields as output a
hypothesis that can best explain the input data. Consider the example from Bhatnagar and Kanal
(1993);
“The surprising fact C is observed. However, if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. Here, C is an observed fact. The second sentence
states the relationship, which is available from the domain knowledge, that the presence of A
explains the presence of C. In the third statement, A is an abductively inferred hypothesis. The
content of the inference is the premise "If A were true, C would be a matter of course” (pp.233)
The existing models of abduction are purely from the logical approach (Konolige, 1992).
In the context of logic-based abduction, Eiter and Gottlob (1995) note that the main decision
problems are:
(i) To determine whether an explanation for the given manifestations exists at all;
(ii) To determine whether an individual hypothesis h Є H is relevant, that is, whether it is part of
at least one acceptable explanation; and
(iii) To determine whether an individual hypothesis is necessary, that is, whether it occurs in all
acceptable explanations.
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3.3.2 Abduction Reasoning from Bayesian Belief Networks
The relationship between Bayesian reasoning and abduction is governed by the assertion
that issues affecting reasoning for example semantics are abductive in nature. Our interest is in
the probabilistic models of uncertainties that enable some explanation to occur in a sensemaking
information network. A set of plausible explanations of a proposition characterizing the context
of interest (Prakken, 2004) can be derived as follows:
Let P(w) =  P(E)

(4)

Where E is an explanation of world w

P( E )  hE P(h) (Assuming independent events E)

P( w | E ) 

P( w & E )
P( E )

(5)

(6)

The numerator term P(w&E) explains the conjunction of w and E while the denominator explains
E. P(w|E) may represent, say, a mass demonstration by Iraqi citizens because of a mosque being
bombed by the coalition force. The abduction problem in sensemaking is: given P(E), explain E,
then try to explain w from these explanations. The difference between deduction and abduction is
illustrated in Figures 6 a and b below. Abduction has been the principal model-based technique
for diagnostic problem solving using models of abnormal behavior in terms of cause-effect
relationships (Peng & Reggia, 1990).
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xˇ
P(x)

P(y|x)

Parent=antecedent

P(y|¬x)

P(y)

Conditionals

Child=consequent

Parent=antecedent

P(x)

P(x|y)

P(x|¬y)

P(y)

Conditionals

Child=consequent

Figure 6. a) Deduction and b) Abduction (adopted from Josang, 2008).
In abductive reasoning, diagnostic problem solving consists of establishing a diagnosis
using cause-effect relationships with a set of observed findings (effects) as the starting point.
This is illustrated by three instances below:
1. Abduction inference makes “backward” inferences based on known causal relations, to
explain or justify a conclusion. Here, the system reasons from effects to causes, instead of causes
to effects. It is a reasoning process that is a reverse of deduction as shown in definition A1.
A1.

Given: the truth of proposition Q
Given: P Q
Infer: P explains Q

Note that in definition A1, P can be background knowledge (also a theory) that describes a
problem domain; Q represents an observation (or a set of observations). We want a hypothesis H
that assumes that P is an abductive explanation for Q.
2. The main issue of abduction is to synthesize a composite hypothesis explaining the entire
observation from elementary hypotheses. Abduction also supposes implicitly that a relationship
is available between hypothesis and observations in the form of rule A2.
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A2.

Given: P Q
Given : Observation Q
Explain hypothesis H

Here, Q may be a fuzzy characterization of the situation.
3. Abduction is a type of reasoning that derives a set of hypotheses (causes) which explain a
given set of events (symptoms) using causal knowledge (relational maps) of the system
functionality. This can be represented in rule A3.
A3.

Given:

Observation, Q

Given:

Hypothesis (H) of disorders

Infer:

the knowledge of H causes or explains Q

As shown in rules A1-A3 above, the main issue of abduction is to synthesize a composite
hypothesis explaining the entire observation from elementary hypotheses. In the sensemaking
process, we tend to seek explanations to unexpected situations. Broadly speaking, abduction
aims at finding explanations for, or causes of, observed phenomena or facts; it is an inference to
the best explanation, a pattern of reasoning that occurs in such diverse places as medical
diagnosis, scientific theory formation, accident investigation, language understanding, and jury
deliberation.
Figure 7 (with only analysis of the left-hand side) illustrates a simple MPE. We define an
end state of the network as a composite hypothesis H0 and to this we assign a prior probability.
The prior probability can be assumed based on the level of past information possessed about a
particular situation that is of interest. For example, H0 could be disrupting stability and support
operations in an urban center. The estimated probability could be from the news media,
intelligence briefings, or simply the commander’s estimate.
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H0

h2

h1

X3

X2

X1

S3
S1

S2

Figure 7. A Sample hierarchical network with different levels of evidence nodes for hierarchical
Bayesian inference.
We can write, P(Ho) =0.4. This means that we are only 40% confident of the plausibility
of our chosen hypothesis. By the axioms of probability, the probability of an alternative
hypothesis P(¬H0) representing any other end state is therefore, P(¬H0)= 0.6 and this need not
be explicitly stated. Similarly we can assign apriori probabilities for the conditional probabilities
of interest representing the probabilities of the children events Xi and Si given the parents, hi and
Xi respectively.
Assume for illustration, the following database is available:
P(h1|H 0) = 0.9; P(h1|¬H0)= 0.8; P(x1 |h1)= 0.7; P(x1|h2)= 0.4; P(S1|x1)= 0.5; P(S1|x2)=0.6
Next, we compute the prior probabilities of all the instantiated variables as follows:
P(h1)= P(h1 |H0)P(H0 ) +P(h 1|¬H0 )P(¬H0)= (0.9)(0.4)+(0.8)(0.6)=0.84 ;P(h 2)=0.16
P(x1)= P(x1|h1)P(h1) + P(x 1|h2)P(h2)=(0.7)(0.84)+(0.4)(0.16) =0.652 ;P(x2)=0.348
P(S1)=P(S1|x1)P(x 1) +P(S1|x2)P(x2)=(0.5)(0.652) +(0.6)(0.348) =0.5348
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Considering the network shown in Figure 7,

 P( X

P( S1 ) 

1

| S1 , S2 , S3 ,..Sr )

S1 ,..s r

(7)

Because of the independence of {S1, S2, S3 ...Sr}, we can write

P( S1 ) 

 P( X

1

| S1..Sr ) P( S1 ) P( S2 ) P( S 3)...P( S r )

S1 ..S r

(8)

P( S1 )  P( X 1 | S1 ) P( S1 )  P( X1 | S2 ) P( S2 )  P( X 1| S3 ) P( S3 ).......P( X 1 | Sr ) P( Sr )

(9)

Clearly, there is a complexity arising from the computation, even for a relatively simple
network. When new evidence is introduced, the analyst is interested in determining the possible
effects on his most probable hypothesis, H 0. Suppose the new evidence points to a new target to
be exploited by the insurgents, the new target may be a coalition Command and Control (C2)
post in a previously secured part of the country. This would definitely require a level of
sophistication, challenging the analyst’s previous hypothesis about the end state of the
insurgency.
Using Bayesian Abduction Inference, we can compute the state of the network with
variable Xi instantiated as follows:

P( H o | X i ) 

P( X i | H o ) 

P( X i | H o ) P( H o )
P( X i )

(X

i

| hn , H o ) P(hn | H o )

h1 ..hn

P( X i | H o )  P( X 1 | h1 , H o ) P(h1 | H o )  P( X 1 | h2 , H o ) P(h2 | H o ).........P( X 1 | hn , H o ) P(hn | H o )
P( X i | H o )  P( X 1 | h1 ) P(h1 | H o )  P( X 1 | h2 ) P(h2 | H o )......P( X 1 | hn ) P(hn | H o )

(10)
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3.3.3 An Application to Sensemaking Analytics
Case 1: Prospective (or Predictive) Sensemaking Analyses:
Based on Pearl (1988) we define a model of recursive Bayesian learning with data updates as
follows: Let H denote a hypothesis, dn = d1 , d2,..dn denote a sequence of data observed in the
past ,and d denote a new fact. A brute force way to calculate the belief in H,P(H|dn, d) would be
to append the new datum d to the past data dn and perform a global computation of the impact
on H of the entire data set dn+1={dn,d}. Under certain conditions, this computation can be
significantly curtailed by incremental updating; once we have computed P(H|dn),we can discard
the past data and compute the impact of the new datum by the formula

P( H | d n , d )  P( H | d n )

P(d | d n , H )
P(d | d n )

(11)

Comparing equation (10) and (11), it is easy to see that the old belief P(H|dn ) assumes the
role of the prior probability in the computation of new impact; it completely summarizes the past
experience and for updating need only be multiplied by the likelihood function P(d|dn, H),which
measures the probability of the new datum d, given the hypothesis and past observations.
The likelihood function is independent on the past data and involves only d and H. For
example, the likelihood that a patient will develop a certain symptom, given that he definitely
suffers from a disease H, is normally independent of what symptoms the patient had in the past.
This conditional independence assumption allows us to write 𝑃 (𝑑 |𝑑𝑛 , 𝐻) = 𝑃(𝑑|𝐻)
and 𝑃 (𝑑|𝑑𝑛 , ¬𝐻) = 𝑃(𝑑|¬𝐻). After dividing equation (11) by the complementary equation for
H, we obtain:

O( H | d n1 )  O( H | d n ) L(d | H ).

(12)
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Equation (12) describes a simple recursive procedure for updating the posterior odds. Upon the
arrival of each new datum d, we multiply the current posterior odds O (H|dn) by the likelihood
ratio of d. This is a prediction model which replicates the behavior of a prospective sensemaking
on datum dn+1.
Case 2: Retrospective Sensemaking Analysis:
Let H represent a set of hypotheses, Hi each of which is equally likely. We can modify Pearl’s
(1988) model to capture retrospective sensemaking as follows: Define an m x n matrix Mk, where
m and n are the number of values that H and Dk might take, respectively; and the (i,j)-th entry of
Mk stands for 𝑀𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃(𝑑𝑘𝑗 |𝐻𝑖 ). Then,
N

P( H i | d1 ,..., d N )  P( H i )[ P(d k | H i )]
k 1

(13)

Equation (13) can be rewritten as:

O(d n | H i 1 )  O(dn | H i ) L( H | d n ).

(14)

3.4 Bayesian Belief Networks
A sensemaking problem often requires an eliciting of beliefs from experts. These beliefs
can be framed as a set of hypotheses. For example, assume there is a bomb attack on a football
stadium in a major university campus. A group of intelligence analysts is asked to build a
sensemaking process model of the bomb attack. Assume also that the analysts start by suggesting
three likely suspicious entities for the bomb attack. Let this be H = {ℎ1 , ℎ2 , ℎ3 }. The analysts
will take on each assumption ℎ𝑖 and identify major issues, suspected causes, and the likely
effects. For the present discussion, ignore the effect and concentrate on the issues (I) and causes
(C). Figure 8 is used to illustrate the analyst’s belief tree about the problem with their associated
belief values estimated to be a number between 0 and 1.
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H: Bomb Attack

0.2

0.5

h1

0.5

I1

0.8

c

0.3

h2

h3

0.5

0.7

0.3

I2

I3

I

0.2

0.5

c

c

0.1

c

0.9

c

Figure 8. Belief tree representing a set of hypotheses about a bomb attack.
In Figure 8, the nodes H, I, and C represent a single analyst assessment of the situation by
speculating on a set of hypotheses (H), the issues related to each hypothesis (I), and the possible
causations (C).If beliefs are converted to probability values in the belief network, then a
probability space can be modeled as a Bayesian Belief Network of propositional variables
(nodes) which may be connected by directed arcs, pairwise. For example, if an arc exists from
node I1 to node C1 , the probability of node C1 assuming a given state ci depends on the actual
state of node I1 (I1 is a direct cause of C1 ). The absence of an arc between two nodes implies that
there is no such direct dependence. If in a Bayesian Belief Network, for all states of the root
nodes the prior probabilities are known, and in addition, for all non-root nodes the conditional
probabilities given the parent states are known, the joint probability distribution is completely
known. This is not the case with the belief network in which only event or causal nodes are
estimated by experts.
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As postulated by Pearl (1988) a belief network also referred to as Bayesian Belief
network (BBN), probabilistic network, or causal network is a directed acyclic graph in which
each node represents a random variable or uncertain quantity which can take two or more
possible values. Arcs signify the existence of direct causal influences between the linked
variables and the strengths of these influences are quantified by conditional probabilities. A BBN
is an augmented directed acyclic graph, represented by a pair (V, E), where, V is a set of
vertices; E is a set of directed edges joining the vertices; and no loops are allowed. Formally, the
structure of the BN is a representation of the factorization of the joint probability distribution
over all the states of the random variable (Heckerman, 1997).
For a BN consisting of n variables X1, X2,..Xn, the overall joint distribution over the
variables is given by the product
n

P( X 1 , X 2 ,..., X n )   P( xi |  X i )
i 1

(15)

where ПXi represents parent variables of Xi. An advantage of network representation is that it
allows people to express directly the fundamental qualitative relationship of direct dependency.
The network then displays a consistent set of additional direct and indirect dependencies and
preserves it as a stable part of the model, independent of the numerical estimates. The
directionality of the arrows is essential for displaying non transitive dependencies. It is this
computational role of identifying what information is relevant or not in any given situation that is
attributed to the mental construct of causation (Zhaoyu &D’ambrosio, 1993).
In general, a BN consists of the following (Russell &Norvig, 2003):
a) A set of random variables (either discrete or continuous) that constitutes the nodes of the
directed graph.
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b) A set of directed edges (arrows) that connects pairs of nodes. If there is an edge from
node Y to node X, Y is called the parent to X and X is referred to as the child to Y.
For every node Xi, there is a conditional probability distribution that quantifies the effect that any
parent nodes have on the node in question. The graph is not allowed to have any directed cycles
and from this, it follows that it is a directed acyclic graph.
According to Onisko (2002), a BN consists of a qualitative part, encoding the existence
of probabilistic influences among a domain’s variables in a directed graph, and a quantitative
part, encoding the joint probability distribution over these variables. The quantification of a
Bayesian Network consists of prior probability distributions over those variables that have no
predecessors in the network and conditional probability distributions over those variables that
have predecessors. These probabilities can easily incorporate available statistics and, where no
data are available, expert judgment.
The most important type of reasoning in Bayesian Networks is belief updating, which
amounts to computing the probability distribution over variables of interest conditional on other
observed variables. For example, in a battle command situation, the commander might receive
intelligence reports about rioting by the population in a contested area. He would be fairly certain
of it being a civil unrest and so refrain from sending in a suppressive force. If in the next instance
however, a routine patrol in the area of unrest did come under sustained fire, then, the probability
of civil unrest would be lowered and his belief would be updated. The hypothesis “insurgent
attack” gets more support and the probability density function over the hypothesis space changes.
In the network situation of Figure 8, drawing such a conclusion is referred to as evidence
propagation. The essence of the Bayesian approach is therefore to provide a formalism
explaining how a person’s existing beliefs can change in the light of new evidence. Depending
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on the complexity of the network, belief updating in Bayesian Networks is considered NP-hard
(Heckerman, 1997), meaning its solution (if it exists) cannot be verified in the polynomial space.
Using the example in Figure 9, we can show some derivations and representations of
conditional probabilities. Consider a simple case of the example network where the variables
have only binary true or false states. For forward inference, consider that the variables S1 and S2
are the variables of interest.
H0: Disrupting stability
and support operations

h1:Resistance and
liberation

X1: Sectarian
violence

h2: Law and order
breakdown

S1: Suicide attack

X2: Threat forces

S2: Mob protest

Figure 9. Example BN of a battle command situation.
S1 is High Level Attrition Attack such as a Suicide Bombing while S2 is a variable
representing a Mob Protest. Variable X1 represents Sectarian Violence while X2 represents
Threat Forces. The composite hypothesis H0 (Disrupting Stability and Support Operations) is
informed by a set of hypotheses h1 (Resistance and Liberation) and h2 (Law and Order
Breakdown).
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By abductive inference:
𝑃(𝑆1 , 𝑆2 )
= ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑃(𝐻0 )𝑃(ℎ1 | 𝐻0 )𝑃(ℎ2 |𝐻0 )𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ1 , ℎ2 )𝑃 (𝑋2 |ℎ1 , ℎ2 )𝑃(𝑆1 |𝑋1 , 𝑋2 )𝑃(𝑆2 |𝑋1 , 𝑋2 )
𝐻0 ℎ1 ℎ2 𝑋1 𝑋2

It is not reasonable to estimate P(S1,S2|H0). That is, we cannot reasonably compute the
probability of Suicide Bombing or Mob Protest even if we are certain both events are linked to an
attempt to disrupt stability and support operations in the area of interest. In order to infer
correctly and with a reasonable degree of confidence, we would like to assess more evidence
such as whether the observed actions are a part of wider resistance and liberation movement or
simply a result of a breakdown in law and order. If the evidence points to a wider resistance,
then, we would be interested in knowing whether it is being perpetuated by sectarian militias or
not.
If however, more evidence supports the hypothesis that it’s a law and order breakdown,
then, we would like to know, with a degree of confidence, whether the breakdown is being
caused by threat forces and criminal elements or by organized sectarian militias. To assess this,
we first have to assume some probability distributions for all the parent nodes and the prior
conditionals for all the variables. Consider the data below as an example:
For node H0
P( H0=T)
0.4

P( H0=F)
0.6

For nodes h1, h2

h1
T
F

H0=T
0.7
0.2

H0=F
0.3
0.8

h2
T
F

H0=T
0.5
0.7

H0=F
0.5
0.3
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For nodes X1, X2
h1
T
T
F
F

h2
T
F
T
F

P(X1=T|h1,h2)
0.2
0.8
0.3
0.6

P(X1=F|h1,h2)
0.8
0.2
0.7
0.4

h1
T
T
F
F

h2
T
F
T
F

P(X2=T|h1,h2)
0.6
0.1
0.8
0.3

P(X2=F|h1,h2)
0.4
0.9
0.2
0.7

For nodes S1, S2
X1
T
T
F
F

X2
T
F
T
F

P(S1 =T|X1,X2)
0.6
0.2
0.7
0.4

P(S1 =F|X1,X2)
0.4
0.8
0.3
0.6

X1
T
T
F
F

X2
T
F
T
F

P(S2 =T|X1,X2)
0.5
0.9
0.4
0.2

P(S2 =F|X1,X2)
0.5
0.1
0.6
0.8

We can generalize the following from the examples above: The child node X1 having
states { xi,1, xi,2…xi,j} , j ≥ 1 is influenced by n parent nodes ,Y2 …Yn (Das,2006). Any parent node
Yi has states {yi,1,y1,2…yi,k}, k≥ 2. The parent nodes represent n random variables Y1..Yn while the
child node represents a random variable X .The network will consist of k1 x….x kn such parental
configurations requiring a Conditional Probability Table (CPT) with as many probability
distributions over the child node X. Such a parental configuration will have a distribution of the
form
{𝑃(𝑥𝑖,1 |𝑦𝑖1, … . , 𝑦𝑖𝑘 ), 𝑃(𝑥𝑖,2 |𝑦𝑖1, … . , 𝑦𝑖𝑘 ), … 𝑃(𝑥𝑖,𝑗 |𝑦𝑖1, … . , 𝑦𝑖𝑘 )}
Where 𝑃(𝑥𝑖,1 |𝑦𝑖1, … . , 𝑦𝑖𝑘 ) is the conditional probability 𝑃(𝑋1 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑗 |𝑌1 =𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑌𝑛 = 𝑦𝑖𝑘 ). Let π
denote the parental configuration, then, the conditional probability may be written as 𝑃(𝑥𝑖,𝑗 |𝜋).
We extend the simple network of Figure 9 into a multi-variable multi-attribute
hierarchical network of Figure 10. Representative of a real world situation, the network will have
many levels to account for the different types of observable evidence in the problem space. Each
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level in the hierarchy will have a large but finite number of variables, each of which may have
more than one state.

Figure 10. Hierarchical BN illustrating the research problem.
The following definitions are provided for the variables in the network displayed in
Figure 10: H0 is a composite hypothesis representing an analyst’s apriori belief about a situation
before new evidence arrives. It is the end state for which the analyst would like to make an
inference. To account for multiple types of uncertainty in the problem domain, H0 is an
aggregation of sub-hypotheses h1, h2, h3 ...hn each of which has a defined apriori belief. The
variables X1, X2 , X3…Xj define the first level of evidence variables. Variables S1, S2, S3…Sk
represent the second level of evidence variables directly influenced by the level one variables.
Depending on the complexity of the problem, the network could have more levels of
evidence or informational variables, sometimes referred to as intermediate or step variables, to
support the correct inference. Variables M1, M2 , M3…Mr represent the target variables which are
typically directly observable evidence variables or variables of some specific significance to the
analyst. Causal representation and the assumption of conditional independence make the
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computation of the conditional probabilities of the evidence variables relatively straightforward.
Table 1 shows the conditional probability values for the network of Figure 10 where each
random variable has several states as shown below. The variable h1 has states h11, h12…h1n.
Table 1
Conditional Probability Tables for the Network of Figure 10

h1
h2
h3
hn
X1
X2
X3
Xj

h11
h21
h32

h31

h33

h22
h32

h31

h33

hn1

hn2

hn3

hn1

hn2

hn3

hn1

hn2

hn3

hn1

hn2

hn3

hn1

hn2

hn3

hn1

hn2

hn3

a1

a2

a3

a4

a5

a6

a7

a8

a9

a10

a11

a12

a13

a14

a15

a16

a17

a18

b1

b2

b3

b4

b5

b6

b7

b8

b9

b10

b11

b12

b13

b14

b15

b16

b17

b18

c1

c2

c3

c4

c5

c6

c7

c8

c9

c10

c11

c12

c13

c14

c15

c16

c17

c18

d1

d2

d3

d4

d5

d6

d7

d8

d9

d 10

d 11

d 12

d 13

d 14

d 15

d 16

d 17

d 18

Let the conditional probabilities of variable Xi for each state of hi be denoted by {ai.,bi,..di
}.Then, we can write
𝑎𝑖 =
𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ31 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ31, ℎ𝑛2 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ31, ℎ𝑛3 ),
𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ32 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ32, ℎ𝑛2 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ32, ℎ𝑛3 ),
𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ33 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ33, ℎ𝑛2 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ33, ℎ𝑛3 )
𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ31 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ31, ℎ𝑛2 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ31, ℎ𝑛3 )
𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ32 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ32, ℎ𝑛2 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ32, ℎ𝑛3 )
𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ33 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ33, ℎ𝑛2 ), 𝑃(𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ33, ℎ𝑛3 )
Where 𝑃 (𝑋1 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ31 , ℎ𝑛1 ) = 𝑃(ℎ11 &ℎ21 &ℎ31 &ℎ𝑛1 |𝑋1 )𝑃(𝑋1 )/𝑃(ℎ11 &ℎ21 &ℎ31 &ℎ𝑛1 )
= 𝑃 (ℎ11 |𝑋1 )𝑃(ℎ21 |𝑋1 )𝑃(ℎ31 |𝑋1 )𝑃 (ℎ𝑛1 |𝑋1 )𝑃(𝑋1 )/ 𝑃(ℎ11 &ℎ21 &ℎ31 &ℎ𝑛1 )
Similarly, we compute conditional probabilities bi and ci. In general, for the jth state of the
random variable X, the conditional probability di is given by
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𝑑𝑖 =
𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ31 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ31, ℎ𝑛2 ), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ31, ℎ𝑛3 ),
𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ32 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ32, ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ32, ℎ𝑛3 ),
𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ33 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ33, ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ21 , ℎ33, ℎ𝑛3 )
𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ31 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ31, ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ31, ℎ𝑛3 )
𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ32 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ32, ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ32, ℎ𝑛3 )
𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ33 , ℎ𝑛1 ), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ33, ℎ𝑛2), 𝑃(𝑋𝑗 |ℎ11 , ℎ22 , ℎ33, ℎ𝑛3 )
Variables with no predecessors are marginally independent while variables that have one or more
common parents but no arc connecting them are conditionally independent of each other, given
their common parents.
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a Bayesian Formalism for representing sensemaking information.
The belief network reflects a person’s belief about the state of a variable in the real world
through the use of joint probability distributions over the variables. Bayesian Networks are
presented as normative cognitive models that support sensemaking under uncertainty. The
networks are shown to support reasoning about evidence and actions not easily handled by other
competing computational models. In Bayesian Belief Networks, the inference is done by
abduction, meaning that we infer from effects to the best explanation of those effects. This
reflects the behavior of a sensemaking problem. Forward (top-down) inference was shown to
support information fusion in prospective sensemaking, while backward (bottom-up) inference
implied support of information fusion in retrospective sensemaking.
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CHAPTER 4
The BAMSS Model
4.1 BAMSS Description
The Bayesian Abduction Model for Sensemaking Support (BAMSS) is developed as an
analytical model to support sensemaking information fusion. The model is validated with
military COA that involves understanding adversary intent. BAMSS can be considered a
knowledge management tool since it allows one to capture and represent knowledge about a
sensemaking context as well as provide analytics for information fusion in the same context.
BAMSS is developed with the Bayesian Network (knowledge construction) while abduction
reasoning is used for inference via a belief network of expert information.
4.1.1. System Software Architecture Description
Figure 11 shows the system software architecture and components of BAMSS.
Java Application
Programming
Interface
(UpdateBayesGA.
Java )

Sensemaking
Database:
Network CPTs

Read/ Write File

Executable
BAMSS file
(BAMSS. Jar)

Java Dynamic
Loadable Libraries
(Jsmile.dll)

SMILE C++
Libraries

Information Fusion
Output

GeNIe graphical
user interface

Figure 11. BAMSS software architecture and components.
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The Structural Modeling, Inference and Learning Engine (SMILE) library of C++ classes
provides the library of functions that are used to implement the Bayesian Network inference
algorithm. SMILE is embedded in the BAMSS model through the use of an Application
Programming Interface (API) that allows the C++ classes to be called within the model. The
model creates a dynamically loadable library (.dll) file of the SMILE libraries called Jsmile.dll in
the Java programming language. Jsmile.dll is configured to provide all the functionality
necessary to implement the build and reasoning process of the Bayesian Network.
Using the Jsmile.dll, an executable file (BAMSS.jar) that stores the computational logic
of the Bayesian inference algorithm is created within the NetBeans Integrated Development
Environment (IDE). The executable BAMSS.jar is called by the user through a simple graphical
user interface (GUI) command line. The .dll file interacts with the executable file in a read/write
mode as shown in Figure 11. The network module is created through the GeNIe graphical user
interface. GeNIe is accessed through a web browser on the client side of a client-server model
and contains all the functionality necessary to create a network with nodes and arrows
representing variables and causal linkages respectively. The networks developed in GeNIe are
loaded into the model by a simple command on the BAMSS GUI.
BAMSS GUI facilitates user interaction with the main building blocks of the model in a
read-only mode. The GUI is implemented in Java with the Java file ProbabilityUI.java and hosts
command lines for all the model functionalities as well as the data input fields. The
BayesianNetworkFitness.java is compiled to create the Java class that contains the subroutine for
calculating the genetic algorithm fitness function. It interfaces with the SMILE library using the
Java API for Genetic Algorithms (JAGA). JAGA API is an extensible API for implementing
genetic algorithms in Java and contains a range of genetic algorithms, genotype representations
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and genetic operators. UpdateBayesGA.java contains classes for the algorithmic implementation
of the Bayesian Genetic Algorithm. GAResults.java is a Java bean class which contains the final
results of the Fitness subroutine after evaluation.
The sensemaking database can be regarded as a repository of conditional probability
tables that represent the knowledge base for the sensemaker. Initially, the database is loaded with
apriori beliefs about the hypothesis variables and apriori conditionals for all the other evidence
variables. The results of the BAMSS.jar executable file run are the posterior probabilities of a
network loaded in the model and represent the updated beliefs of the sensemaker. These results
are added into the database using a GUI command line and form the apriori beliefs for the next
round of computation in read/write format. The results are saved and made available to the user
for analyses.
Software development for the model was implemented in a dedicated Java IDE known as
NetBeans. An IDE is a software application that provides a comprehensive build environment for
software development. The NetBeans IDE consists of a source code editor, build automation
tools and a code debugger. Currently, the network module is implemented and hosted in GeNIe;
the graphical interface to SMILE. The web-based interface to the network module resides on the
client-server model hosting the GeNIe software. The computational module and the GUI are
standalone applications developed in the NetBeans IDE. Open Source code for the Bayesian
Clustering Algorithm and the Genetic Algorithm was downloaded and configured in the IDE
using a Java API. An API specifies how the software components should interact with each other
to produce the desired functionality. The final result of the build process is an executable .jar file
which contains the business logic of the computational module, a library of functionalities, the
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GUI, and is operable on the Windows suite of Operating Systems (98/NT/2000/XP). BAMSS is
supported by a suite of software and hardware systems as shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Supporting Hardware and Software Suite for BAMSS
Software

Description

Java

Java
programming
language

JRE

Java Runtime
Environment

As used in
BAMSS
Graphical user
interface and
computational
algorithm
implementation

Development of
the Java
applications

Java API

Application
Programming
Interface

Facilitates
interaction with
the SMILE C++
libraries

NetBeans
IDE

NetBeans
Integrated
Development
Environment

Python 2.7

Interactive
objectoriented
programming
language

Development
environment for
BAMSS
algorithm source
codes
Genetic algorithm
implementation.

PySide
1.2.2

A Python
Software for
generating
bindings to
the cross
platform GUI
toolkit QT4
Java API for
Genetic
Algorithms

JAGA

Advantage

Disadvantages

Class based, objectoriented and platform
independent. Has few
implementation
dependencies, is
dynamic and robust

Longer execution
times as it runs first
on JVM (Java
Virtual Machine).
Also requires
larger memory
allocation than
other languages

Combines the Java
virtual machine,
platform core classes
and supporting
libraries
Allows easy use of
C++ libraries using
inbuilt callable
functions, portable
and platform
independent
Extensible and easy
modular design .Also
has a large library of
most commonly used
APIs
Platform
independent, easy
modular design,
extensible in C++
and for applications
that need API.

Implementing the
graphical library
of the genetic
algorithm

Platform independent
and simple to use
when creating menus

Genetic algorithm
implementation in
Java

Free and open source,
contains an extensive
library of GAs, GA
operators and
genotype
representations

Manufacturer
Oracle
Network
Corporation

Oracle
Corporation
JRE requires a
substantial memory
allocation.
Slower and takes
more memory
space

Oracle
Corporation

Oracle
Corporation

Slower
computation time
compared to C++
or Java, user has to
maintain external
library
dependencies
Gets complicated
to debug. Not too
much
documentation to
support
development

Python
Software
Foundation

None

University
College
London,
available at
www.jaga.org

Qt Project
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Table 2
Cont.
GeNIe

Graphical
Network
Interface

SMILE

Structural
Modeling,
Inference,
and Learning
Engine

Hardware
Bandwidth

Laptop (PC)
Operates on 2.4 GHz and 5.0 GHz radio
frequencies (RF) bands
 802.11g : < 54 Mbps
 802.11n : < 150 Mbps
 Intel Core 2 Dual Core (2.93 GHz)
 Windows (98,NT,2000,XP)
 Red Hat Linux
 Mac OS X
 Dual Band : < 64 (32 for the 2.4 GHz and 32
for the 5.0 GHz)

Processor
Operating
System
Scalability

Windows user
interface to
SMILE; network
module
development
C++ libraries of
hierarchical
Bayesian network
inference
algorithms

Open source
software, intuitive
and easy to learn and
use

Too much bugs;
Exception
handling is difficult

Open source,
platform independent
and can be
implemented in Java
and Python

The software is
provided as is, lack
of development
documentation.

Decision
Systems
Laboratory
University of
Pittsburg
Decision
Systems
Laboratory,
University of
Pittsburg

BAMSS is implemented using Open Source software freely available under the GNU
General Public License, the most widely used free software license. It consists of three modules:
A network module, a computational module and a GUI for user interface. The modular
architecture and the Open Source implementation ensure that the model can be modified with
additional modules or developed further to address new challenges.
The BAMSS Network module uses the existing GeNIe library and allows the user to
develop a Bayesian Network representation of the problem domain. This module is important
because it allows users to define causal relations among the domain variables of interest. The
user develops a Bayesian Network which qualitatively represents the problem domain to be
modeled from these relations and by using directed acyclic graphs (DAG). Quantitatively, the
user defines the network nodes and assigns prior probabilities which serve as inputs to the
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computational module. Prior conditionals and marginal probability distributions are all input by
the user based on his apriori knowledge of the problem domain. The user can develop several
networks based on his/her core knowledge of the problem domain and store such networks in a
repository on the client side of the network.
The Computational module takes the input data from the Network and performs belief
updating and abductive inference using two inference algorithms. The Clustering Algorithm
(Lauritzhen & Spiegenhalter, 1988; Jensen et al, 1990) is implemented to perform Bayesian
belief updating. The Clustering Algorithm is an exact algorithm that works by compiling the
DAG into a junction tree and then, updating the probability there. The Genetic Algorithm (GA)
introduced by Goldberg (1989) and Mengshoel (1999) is an evolutionary search and optimization
algorithm for quick variable classification and identification of complete solution sets. In the
Bayesian Network module, abductive inference using the GA is accomplished by computing the
MPE or kMPE of events in the Bayesian Network. Both algorithms in the main user interface
have been implemented in Java.
The GUI module enables user interaction with BAMSS. It integrates the network module
and the computational module and allows the user to manipulate inputs (evidence) while
observing the changes in the outputs. The textual and graphical output helps in the analysis of the
effects of the new evidence on the hypotheses or target variables. The interface is the front-end
to the computational module and enables easy and intuitive data input into it while the
visualization of the output makes it easier to for the user to understand. It enables the user to
directly input values for new evidence or load a network from file. The GUI for the
computational module has been designed as a standalone application to be hosted on the client
PC and runs on Windows or Linux Operating Systems.
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An example code for BAMSS implementation in Java is shown in Figure 12.
ntw.setBayesianAlgorithm(Network.BayesianAlgorithmType.Lauritzen);
ntw.updateBeliefs();
logger.info("Network initialisation completed.............");
} catch (Error ex) {
this.showMessage("SMILE", ex.getMessage());
logger.debug(ex.getMessage(), ex);
}
}
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………….
private void updateBeliefbayesActionPerformed(java.awt.event.ActionEvent evt) {//
GEN-FIRST:event_updateBeliefbayesActionPerformed
if (fileChooserTextField.getText().equals("")) {
this.showMessage("SMILE- XDSL file not found", "Please select Model file first");
return;
}

double xd = 0, x12 = 0, x13 = 0, x21 = 0, x22 = 0, x23 = 0, x24 = 0, x31 = 0, x32 = 0,
x33 = 0;
double md = 0, m12 = 0, m13 = 0, m21 = 0, m22 = 0, m23 = 0, m24 = 0, m31 = 0, m32 =
0, m33 = 0, m41 = 0, m42 = 0, m43 = 0, m44 = 0;
double td = 0, t12 = 0, t13 = 0, t21 = 0, t22 = 0, t23 = 0, t31 = 0, t32
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………
this.updateBayes(xd, x12, x13, x21, x22, x23, x24, x31, x32, x33, yd, y12, y13, y14, y21,
y22, y31, y32, y33, y41, y42, y43, md, m12, m13, m21, m22, m23, m24, m31, m32, m33,
m41, m42, m43, m44, td, t12, t13, t21, t22, t23, t31, t32);
} catch (Exception ex) {
this.showMessage("SMILE", ex.getMessage());
logger.debug(ex.getMessage(), ex);
ex.printStackTrace();
}
}//GEN-LAST:event_updateBeliefbayesActionPerformed
private void x31InputActionPerformed(java.awt.event.ActionEvent evt) {//GENFIRST:event_x31InputActionPerformed
// TODO add your handling code here:
}//GEN-LAST:event_x31InputActionPerformed
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………...

Figure 12. Sample BAMSS implementation in Java.

57
4.1.2 Informational Flow Architecture in BAMSS
A generic representation of the architecture and information flow in the BAMSS model is
shown in Figure 12. Initially, a user defined domain specific BBN is created and loaded into the
model from file or any other linked database.
1. Observed data
2. Apriori knowledge
a)Prior probabilities
of parent nodes
b)Prior conditionals of
child nodes

Problem Definition
1. Define the domain state
space
2.Identify critical variables
3.Establish discretization states
for the variables

1.Bayesian Clustering
Algorithm
2. Genetic Algorithm
a)Belief Updating
b)Belief Revision
c)Abductive inference

Load BBN from File

Probability
values from
the user
Input Evidence
Values, P(h),P(e)
Output Results
P(h|e);P(e|h)

Belief network
with CPT
initialized
Network
Module

Graphical
User
Interface

Computational
Module
Updated
BBN

Updated BBN

Posterior probabilities for
model inference
1. P(h|e):Prospective
Sensemaking
2. P(e|h):Retrospective
sensemaking

Figure 13. Information flow architecture in BAMSS.
Problem definition is undertaken in the network module during the development of the
Belief Network. This involves defining the domain state space, identifying all the critical causal
variables and their relationships, and establishing discretization states for all the identified
variables. The network topology is also defined at this stage. New evidence such as observed
data from the field or user defined prior probabilities of the parent nodes and the prior
conditional probabilities of the child nodes are input into the developed network through the
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GUI. The prior probabilities are obtained from expert judgment based on the user’s tacit
knowledge or historical records which document similar cases and their outcomes. In a
collaborative work setting, the choice of priors may be a simple case of conjecture where several
analysts brainstorm and agree on values that may be deemed representative of the domainspecific problem.
In the topology of the Network, the user defines the hypothesis variables, the evidence
variables and the target variables of interest. A fully defined BBN with a defined topology and
CPTs is then, loaded into the model through the GUI functionality. With the network loaded and
initialized, evidence in the form of probabilities is input into the model through the GUI. The
network module retrieves the input evidence from the user and initializes the appropriate BBN.
The Belief Network with the initialized CPTs is then loaded into the computational module. The
computational module is the inference engine of the model and undertakes updating of the
Network Beliefs, Belief Revision, and Abductive Inference. Two algorithms are defined for this
module; a clustering algorithm which is the fastest exact algorithm for the hierarchical Bayesian
Network inference and a GA which is an approximate fast search and optimization algorithm for
performing the Abductive Inference.
The GUI provides the option of selecting one or both of the algorithms and inputting
parameters that are appropriate for each algorithm. The results of the computation are received
as output by the user through the GUI and comprise of textual output of the posterior
probabilities of the variables in the Belief Network and a graphical display of the updated Belief
Network. The updated Belief Network is also loaded and stored in the Network module and can
be retrieved by the computational module for the next iteration of Belief updating. Updated
Beliefs form the prior probabilities for the network when the new evidence arrives.
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The user can draw inferences through the posterior probability output derived from the
computational module, concerning the best (most probable hypothesis) variable by Abductive
Inference and this is referred to as prospective sensemaking. In the domain of asymmetric
warfare, the “probability of attack| evidence” requires the best COA selection P(h|e) from among
all the hypotheses variables H in the updated Network. The user may also designate target nodes
in the evidence variables and compute the probability P(e|h) in the case of retrospective
sensemaking. In the problematic domain under study, the “probability of attack” is known or set
to a certain value by the user and the change in the value of the target nodes “probability of
evidence|attack” is observed. In this case, the analyst is interested in finding out the most
probable causal variable(s) that could produce the selected hypothetical outcome.
4.1.3 Inference Algorithm in BAMSS
To draw the Bayesian Network inference, the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm is used for
data classification (Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter, 1988; Jensen et al., 1990). The algorithm works
by first transforming the hierarchical Bayesian Network into a clique tree where each node in the
tree corresponds to a subset of variables in the original graph. Message propagation is done over
the clique tree. By transmitting information between the variables in the local clique rather than
the full joint probability, one can realize and make tractable an efficient inference algorithm and
inference in complex Bayesian Networks. The choice of the algorithm may be made based on the
requirements for exact and efficient solution using BAMSS. These requirements, as first
discussed by Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter (1988), for a hierarchical Bayesian network are
described below:
1) Initialization: Generating internal representations of beliefs from which the marginal
distributions on individual nodes may be easily obtained.
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2) Absorption of evidence: The effect of multiple pieces of evidence should be independent
of the order of their arrival
3) Global propagation: The algorithm should enable the propagation of the effects of the
evidence received through the Network and enable for Belief revision in the nodes that
are still not established.
4) Hypothesizing and propagating single items of evidence: The algorithm should allow for
the ability to condition on a node taking on a particular value and observe its effect
throughout the network.
5) Planning: For nodes of particular interest, the algorithm should provide for the ability to
efficiently assess the informational value in eliciting the response to nodes corresponding
to potentially obtainable data.
6) Influential findings: After the data are in, the algorithm should have an ability to retract
their effect in order to identify the strong causal factors.
The clustering algorithm satisfies these requirements for BAMSS. The algorithm works
hierarchically starting with the nodes at the top of the network and randomly (depending on the
node distribution) selecting a state. This state will then be set and will influence the probabilities
of all the nodes that have that node as a parent. The algorithm moves through all the nodes this
way, randomly selecting states and setting them as evidence. The sampling is complete when a
state is assigned to all the nodes and Belief updating is then performed.
According to the second requirement, BAMSS uses information from multiple sources of
uncertainty as input. The evidence variables are informational variables since they reveal
information about hypothesis variables. The process of computationally combining these
informational variables to perform inferences on some target variable (usually a hypothesis
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variable) is referred to as information fusion. The pseudo code for BAMSS inference algorithm
is shown in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Bayesian inference algorithm for BAMSS.
4.1.4 BAMSS Working Memory
Figure 15 shows a screen capture of the GUI for the BAMSS working memory. In the
first operation, the domain specific BBN from a file residing on the client computer is loaded
into the module. With the BBN loaded, the user can use the GUI to perform other required
functions such as inputting new evidence, using commands for computing posterior probabilities,
performing inference and so on. The interface can be divided into four quadrants. The first
quadrant contains the input fields for all the random variables defined in the Network module.
The Network residing on the client side database is loaded into the GUI using the “Select Model
File” command line. Evidence in the form of numeric probabilities is then typed into the
evidence input fields. The fields are grouped according to the defined network hierarchical levels
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with the topmost level containing fields for hypothesis variables, followed by fields for Level 1
evidence variables, Level 2 evidence variables, Level 3 evidence variables and Level 4 evidence
variables. The evidence input fields are non-mandatory, that is, the user can input evidence for a
single variable or can select multiple variables on different levels.

Figure 15. Graphical user interface for the BAMSS model.
To perform computational inference, the appropriate algorithm is selected from the
command buttons at the bottom of the first quadrant. Selecting “Update Belief-Bayes” will
enable the computation of the posterior beliefs of the Network variables given new evidence
using the clustering algorithm. The algorithm gets the query and goes through the cyclic process
of hierarchically sampling the nodes and assigning states until all the nodes in the network have
an assigned state. Belief updating is then undertaken and the completed results are compiled and
output by the appropriate function in the ProbabilityUI.java subroutine. Selection of the GA
requires input of a fitness value and some optional GA parameters such as the probability of
mutation. The results for both algorithms can be exported into a text file format using the
appropriate “Export” command button.
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The second and third quadrants show the results of the Belief updating process for the
selected algorithm, both textually and graphically. The GA textual results fields display the
gene/variable combination that constitutes a network solution for the input data. The last
quadrant on the bottom right shows the graphical plots of the GA search process for all the
network variables for the specified number of generations until the stop criterion is met. The
“Clear Evidence” command button allows the user to clear the input and output fields of the GUI
and input new evidence at any point of time.
4.2 Sample Application: Sensemaking in Asymmetric Warfare Domain
4.2.1 Identification of Domain Variables
The US Army led invasion of Iraq − Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq, 2003-2009)
and Afghanistan, − Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan, 2001-2014) and the ArabIsraeli conflict − particularly the Israeli-Hezbollah War (Lebanon, 2006) were used as case
studies for domain understanding, variable identification and extracting the BAMSS data set.
The identified domain variables and their relationships were iteratively refined following
interactions with the domain experts before the final set of variables and links was selected to
create the Network structure. By expert consensus, four key effects that supported a
commander’s asymmetric battlespace analysis were also identified.
The first level variables identified were Strategic Effects. In the Network topology, these
were defined as the level 1 hypotheses variables representing the end states, target states, or
goals of the adversary that the Blue Force commander would have to correctly infer for
successful counterinsurgency operations. These effects could be both short-term and long-term.
These top level effects informed the commander of the adversary’s strategies and were key for
effective COA planning. Strategic effects were directly influenced by Political Operational
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Effects which constituted level 2 evidence variables. Political Operational Effects were defined
as informational variables that represented the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information
and Infrastructural (PMESII) variables of the battlespace. The operational environment would
need to integrate the PMESII variables to fully define the battlespace. The PMESII variables
were identified as causal mechanisms that could influence the Strategic Effects.
Military Operational Effects were informational variables that the adversary could exploit
to achieve the desired end state or target state. In the Network topology, these variables
constituted level 3 evidence variables that commanders and their staffs would need to analyze to
correctly infer the desired end state of the adversary. The adversary could aim at generating and
exploiting fine scale complexity and seek to prevent the counterinsurgents from acting at the
scale they were organized for: large scale but limited complexity environment (Ryan, 2008).
These effects could be deemed dynamic variables that changed constantly depending on changes
in both the internal and external factors of a group. These variables could also directly influence
the Political Operational Effects.
Tactical effects were identified as informational variables that represented the tactical
effects of the battlespace and constituted level 4 evidence variables in the Network topology.
These were sensor observable and represented actions taken by the insurgents to influence
certain outcomes in the battlespace. Depending on the choice of targets, the range of Tactical
Effects was considered to be very extensive and diverse. Most of these effects were kinetic and
their strategic outcome was usually second order and not necessarily a direct outcome.
Destruction of a key military installation for example, could have value not in the physical
destruction of the target but in the psychological impact the COA would generate among the
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population. Figure 16 shows an example network to represent the levels of information discussed
in the preceding section.

Figure 16. BN topology for adversary intent inference in asymmetric battlespace.
4.2.2 Discretization of the Bayesian Network Variables
The variables in the Network as shown in Figure 16 are discretized into nonnumeric sub
factors so as to use the exact search algorithm implemented in BAMSS. The discretization is
based on factors obtained from literature review as well as expert judgment. The states of each
node in the Network are sub-factors, and they represent all the possible indicators each variable
can take within the domain state space. With the Network topology defined and all the variables
discretized, we can fully specify its parameters.
Network parameterization is completed by learning the prior probabilities of all the nodes
without parents and the conditional probabilities of all the nodes with parents, conditional on
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these parents. A description of all the Network variables along with their discrete states or
indicators is provided in Appendix A. With the discretization of the variables and the discrete
states defined, the next step is to perform simulation with the model.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation
4.3.1 The Simulation Process
A simulation experiment was used to validate BAMSS using historical data. Initial
probabilities for the parent nodes were obtained from intensive research of databases and reports
on insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East. An example of a database
used is the RAND Database of Worldwide (RDWTI), available at
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html (web accessed on 12/16/2013). The
RDWTI is a compilation of data from 1968 through 2009 and is free and publicly accessible for
research and analysis.
Although the database deals primarily with terrorism incidents, these data were
considered relevant because terrorism is always used as an operations tactic by insurgents. The
attributes of terrorism considered relevant to this study are available in the RDWTI and include
factors such as its use as a military tactic, psychological intentions to cause fear and alarm
among the population, targeting of civilians and the military forces, group dynamics, and
political motivation. More apriori data was obtained from the Global Terrorism Data base
(GTD), an Open Source database hosted by the University of Maryland and the Brookings
Institution (http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ web accessed on 12/16/2013). Other information from
the databases was derived based their proportion (percentage) of occurrences. Where
appropriately defined, these data provided initial prior probabilities. Tables 3, 4, and 5 contain
data obtained from these available databases. The data are summarized and reformatted to focus
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only on the key variables in the problem domain. Table 3 gives the range of targeted actions used
by insurgents in the region. In the asymmetric battlespace domain, we have focused on some of
these targeted actions to inform our range of adversary Tactical Effects. Table 4 lists the
weapons used to implement the targeted actions, an important part of the Tactical Effects
modelling.
Table 3
The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, Middle East Region: Targeted Actions
2003-2007
Tactic
Bombing
Armed Attack
Kidnapping
Assassination
Unknown
Arson
Other
Unconventional Attack
Barricade/Hostage
Other
Hijacking

Count
6261
4248
816
435
140
42
21
9
8
5
2

Percentage
52.23 %
35.44 %
6.81 %
3.63 %
1.17 %
0.35 %
0.18 %
0.08 %
0.07 %
0.04 %
0.02 %

Table 4
The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, Middle East Region: Weapons, 20032007
Weapon
Explosives
Firearms
Unknown
Remote-detonated explosive
Fire or Firebomb
Knives & sharp objects
Other
Chemical Agent

Count
6103
4850
455
349
115
67
40
8

Percentage
50.91 %
40.46 %
3.8 %
2.91 %
0.96 %
0.56 %
0.33 %
0.07 %
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Table 5
The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, Middle East Region: Targets, 20032007
Target
Police
Private Citizens & Property
Government
Other
Religious Figures/Institutions
Utilities
Business
Transportation
Educational Institutions
Journalists & Media
Diplomatic
Unknown
Military
NGO
Telecommunication
Airports & Airlines
Terrorists/Former Terrorists
Tourists
Food or Water Supply

Count
3827
2589
1773
1123
705
458
418
220
216
198
146
130
70
47
29
16
12
5
4

Percentage
31.93 %
21.6 %
14.79 %
9.37 %
5.88 %
3.82 %
3.49 %
1.84 %
1.8 %
1.65 %
1.22 %
1.08 %
0.58 %
0.39 %
0.24 %
0.13 %
0.1 %
0.04 %
0.03 %

The data were input into the BAMSS model and a simulation run was performed. CPTs
for all nodes conditional on the predecessor nodes were also populated. For the CPT elicitation, a
Noisy-Max canonical model function built in GeNIe was used to provide a logarithmic reduction
in the complexity of parameter estimation in the BN (Pradhan et al., 1994; Onisko et al., 2000).
In this canonical model, the presence of one causal factor in the parent node was sufficient to
produce an impact in the child node. This canonical model was especially useful for the BAMSS
network because the influence of each parent node on the child node needed to be considered
independent of the other parents. Additionally, we did not need to specify all the causal factors
necessary to produce an outcome in order to define the CPTs because this could be difficult for
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the experts and computationally intractable to learn from datasets. Therefore, the Noisy-Max
model was deemed best applicable to real life problems. The use of this canonical model for
multi-valued variables has been advocated by Zagorecki and Druzdzel (2006) Zagorecki,
Voortman and Druzdzel (2006), and Dietz (1993). Figure 17 shows a complete 14 node network
developed for the simulation .As an example, Table 6 defines the nodes and the states for each
level 2 (Political Operational Effects) variable node used in the CPT computation.
Y2:Establish political
Infrastructure

Y3: Control of
political space
Y4: Promotion of
fundamentalist ideology

Y1: Resistance and
liberation from
occupation

X1:Ethnic and
sectarian supremacy

M1:Targeted
assassinations and
attacks on institutions

X3:Exploiting the
battlespace
asymmetry

X2: Disruption of
Stability and Support
Operations

M3:Undermining the
legitimate government
structures

M2:Sectarian and
religious violence

T1:High level
attrition attacks
T2:Low level
attrition attacks

M4:Projecting
military
capability

T3: Attacks on Critical
infrastructure

Figure 17. BAMSS course of action analysis network.
An example of the populated CPTs for the Political Operational Effects variables X1 , X2
and X3 conditional on the Strategic Effects nodes Y1,Y2, Y3 and Y4 is shown in Tables 6 - 9.
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Table 6
Complete CPT Elicited for Level 2 Nodes of the BAMSS COA Analysis Network
Y1
Y2
Y3

y11= Resistance and liberation
y21=Sectarian Governance Structures
y31=Political
y32=Control of y33=Disruption
opposition

Y4
x11
x12
x13
x21
x22
x23
x24
x31
x32
x33

security Space

of civic
processes
y42
y43

y22=Insurgent Ideology
y31=Political
y32=Control of
y33=Disruption of
opposition

security space

civic processes

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

0.43

0.43

0.43

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.43

0.43

0.43

0.41

0.41

0.44

0.42

0.42

0.42

0.41

0.41

0.41

0.32

0.33

0.32

0.31

0.31

0.31

0.32

0.33

0.32

0.33

0.34

0.33

0.32

0.32

0.32

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.23

0.23

0.23

0.24

0.23

0.24

0.24

0.24

0.24

0.24

0.24

0.24

0.24

0.24

0.24

0.25

0.24

0.25

0.23

0.23

0.19

0.23

0.23

0.19

0.19

0.19

0.14

0.19

0.19

0.15

0.19

0.19

0.15

0.15

0.15

0.10

0.44

0.44

0.47

0.44

0.44

0.47

0.47

0.47

0.49

0.46

0.46

0.49

0.46

0.46

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.52

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.47

0.48

0.47

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.47

0.48

0.47

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.36

0.36

0.36

0.39

0.38

0.39

0.39

0.38

0.39

0.32

0.32

0.32

0.34

0.34

0.34

0.34

0.34

0.34

0.15

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.19

0.19

0.19

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.21

0.20

0.21

Table 7
Complete CPT Elicited for Level 2 Nodes of the BAMSS COA Analysis Network
Y1
Y2
Y3

y12=Law and order breakdown
y21=Sectarian governance structures
y31=Political
y32=Control of y33=Disruption
opposition

Y4
x11
x12
x13
x21
x22
x23
x24
x31
x32
x33

security space

of civic
processes
y42
y43

y31=Political
opposition

y22=Insurgent ideology
y32=Control of
y33=Disruption of
security space

civic processes

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

0.40

0.40

0.40

0.41

0.41

0.41

0.40

0.40

0.40

0.38

0.38

0.38

0.39

0.39

0.39

0.38

0.38

0.38

0 20

0.20

0.20

019

0.19

0.19

019

0.19

0.19

0.21

0.21

0.21

0. 19

0.19

0.19

0.19

0.20

0.19

0.39

0.38

0.39

0.39

0.39

0.39

0.40

0.39

0.40

0.40

0.39

0.40

0. 40

0.40

0.40

0.41

0.40

0.41

0.23

0.23

0.19

0.23

0.23

0.19

0.19

0.19

0.14

0.19

0.19

0.15

0.19

0.19

0.15

0.15

0.15

010

0.44

0.44

0.47

0.44

0.44

0.47

0.47

0.47

0.49

0.46

0.46

0.49

0.46

0.46

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.52

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.47

0.48

0.47

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.47

0.47

0.47

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.44

0.36

0.35

0.36

0.38

0.38

0.38

0.38

0.38

0.38

0.31

0.31

0.31

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.33

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.16

0.17

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.22

0.21

0.22

0.22

0.22

0.22
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Table 8
Complete CPT Elicited for Level 2 Nodes of the BAMSS COA Analysis Network
Y1
Y2
Y3

y13=Population control
y21=Sectarian governance structures
y31=Political
y32=Control of y33=Disruption
opposition

Y4
x11
x12
x13
x21
x22
x23
x24
x31
x32
x33

security space

y22=Insurgent ideology
y32=Control of
y33=Disruption of

y31=Political

of civic
processes
y42
y43

opposition

security space

civic processes

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.51

0.51

0.41

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.48

0.49

0.48

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.48

0.49

0.48

0 20

0.20

0.20

019

0.19

0.19

019

0.19

0.19

0.20

0.21

0.20

0. 19

0.19

0.19

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.29

0.29

0.29

0.29

0.29

0.29

0.30

0.29

0.30

0.30

0.29

0.30

0. 30

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.30

0.23

0.23

0.19

0.23

0.23

0.19

0.19

0.19

0.14

0.19

0.19

0.15

0.19

0.19

0.15

0.15

0.15

010

0.44

0.44

0.47

0.44

0.44

0.47

0.47

0.47

0.49

0.46

0.46

0.49

0.46

0.46

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.52

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.15

0.15

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.32

0.33

0.32

0.28

0.29

0.28

0.28

0.29

0.28

0.32

0.33

0.32

0.28

0.29

0.28

0.28

0.29

0.28

0.50

0.50

0.50

0.53

0.53

0.53

0.53

0.53

0.53

0.45

0.45

0.45

0.48

0.48

0.48

0.48

0.48

0.47

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.21

0.21

0.21

0.22

0.22

0.22

0.22

0.22

0.22

Table 9
Complete CPT Elicited for Level 2 Nodes of the BAMSS COA Analysis Network
Y1
Y2
Y3

y14=Excessive force
y21=Sectarian governance structures
y22=Insurgent ideology
y31=Political
y32=Control of
y33=Disruption
y31=Political
y32=Control of
y33=Disruption
opposition

Y4
x11
x12
x13
x21
x22
x23
x24
x31
x32
x33

security space

of civic
processes
y42
y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

0.40

0.40

0.40

0.41

0.41

0.41

0.40

0.40

0 20

0.20

0.20

019

0.19

0.19

019

0.19

0.39

0.38

0.39

0.39

0.39

0.39

0.40

0.18

0.18

0.14

0.18

0.18

0.14

0.14

0.47

0.47

0.50

0.47

0.47

0.50

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.16

0.17

0.16

0.16

0.31

0.32

0.31

0.27

0.46

0.46

0.46

0.49

0.21

0.21

0.21

0.22

opposition

security space

of civic
processes
y42
y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

y42

y43

y41

0.40

0.38

0.38

0.38

0.39

0.39

0.39

0.38

0.38

0.38

0.19

0.21

0.21

0.21

0. 19

0.19

0.19

0.19

0.20

0.19

0.39

0.40

0.40

0.39

0.40

0. 40

0.40

0.40

0.41

0.40

0.41

0.14

0.09

0.14

0.14

0.09

0.09

0.14

0.09

0.09

0.09

0.04

0.50

0.50

0.53

0.49

0.49

0.52

0.52

0.49

0.52

0.52

0.52

0.55

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.18

0.17

0.18

0.18

0.18

0.19

0.17

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.17

0.17

0.18

0.18

0.17

0.18

0.18

0.18

0.19

0.28

0.27

0.27

0.28

0.27

0.31

0.32

0.27

0.28

0.27

0.27

0.27

0.28

0.27

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.49

0.40

0.40

0.43

0.43

0.43

0.43

0.43

0.43

0.43

0.22

0.22

0.22

0.22

0.22

0.27

0.27

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.28

0.28
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Belief update was undertaken after the CPT computation and the resultant posterior probabilities
for all the nodes were displayed. Figure 18 shows this in a forward inference scheme. The output
displayed on the right side of the GUI is both graphical and textual.

Figure 18. Belief updating (posterior probabilities) of the nodes in the network after new
evidence is introduced.
For illustration purposes, assume that the evidence for the hypotheses variables Y1,Y2, Y3
and Y4 is set as follows: Let the probability of node Y1 being in state y11= 0.4 represent the belief
that there is a 40% chance that the objective of the insurgency is resistance and liberation of the
country from occupation. Node Y1 = y12 is ascribed a probability of 0.3, meaning there is a 30%
chance that a breakdown in law and order to disrupt counterinsurgent control of the local security
situation is the effect under observation. Less belief Y1 = y13= 0.2 is given to probability that the
insurgent’s intent is to exercise local population control. By the axioms of probability, the
complement Y1 = y14 = 0.1 represents our belief that the effect under observation is simply an
intent by the insurgents to provoke excessive raids by the counterinsurgent forces and use the
second order effects of that action as a strategy for resistance.
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To account for multiple sources of information, the input fields are not mutually
exclusive and the values for nodes Y2, Y3 and Y4 may be input. Assume that there is reason to
believe that the end state of the insurgency is to establish some form of political infrastructure to
legitimize the armed struggle (Y2). If this hypothesis is chosen, then, it is believed that the effect
under observation is related to the development of sectarian governance structures with a
probability Y2 = y21 = 0.8. The complement Y2 = y22 = 0.2 is attributed to the hypothesis that the
insurgency political agenda is driven purely by radical ideologies to which the followers
subscribe. Variables Y3 (y31 = 0.5, y32 = 0.1, y33 = 0.4) and Y4 (y41 = 0.6, y42 = 0.2, y43 = 0.1) are
similarly defined.
Next, we input the evidence values for level 2 evidence variables, the Political
Operational Effects X1, X2 and X3 . This is evidence that is obtainable by direct observation of
battlefield conditions or by analyzing information from various sources. It is known that a major
influencing factor for conflict in the Middle East is ethnic and sectarian supremacy (X1). By
analyzing reports, the indicators are weighted such that fundamentalist ideology X1 = x12 is most
probable at 50%. Equally probable is the legitimacy of Jihad or armed struggle against nonbelievers X1 |x13 = 0.4. Sectarian identity (X1 = x11), though a dominant concept in insurgencies, is
weakly supported with a 0.1 probability. For factor X2, evidence for disruption of the ability to
carry out nation-building and stability operations is assessed. To this, there is slightly more
evidence of operational modularity (X2 = x22 = 0.4), than the exploitation of local environment
and feedback mechanisms (X2 = x21 = 0.3). Little evidence supports the notion of ad hoc threat
forces, criminal networks or part time forces (X2 = x23 = 0.1) while direct force projection to send
a message of capability to the population (X2 = x24 = 0.2) is marginally better. Similarly, evidence
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values for variable X3 (x31 = 0.6, x32 = 0.2, x33 = 0.2) are input. More evidence may be entered for
level 3 (Military Operational Effects) and level 4 (Political Operational Effects) variables.
The right hand side of Figure 18 shows the textual and graphical output of the computed
posterior beliefs of all the network variables after Belief Update in the light of new evidence is
performed. For the input evidence values discussed above, the computed posterior beliefs
(correct to three decimal places) are as follows: For variable Y1, y11 = 0.335, y12 = 0.457, y13 =
0.178, y14 = 0.030. The net effect of the new evidence was to decrease our belief in hypothesis Y1
= y11 from 40% to 34% and increase our belief in hypothesis Y1 = y12 from 30% to 46%. For
variable Y2 , y21 = 0.840 and y22 = 0.150. In this case, the new evidence did not significantly
change our belief concerning the variable. The same conclusion may be drawn for variables Y3
and Y4, whose posterior beliefs are y31 = 0.476, y32 = 0.082, y33 = 0.441, y41 = 0.558, y42 = 0.252,
y43 = 0.189.
The computed posterior beliefs for the Political Operational Effects nodes X1, X2 and X3
are: X1[ x11 = 0.126, x12 = 0.376, x13 = 0.497], X2[x21 = 0.203, x22 = 0.629, x23 = 0.056, x24 = 0.112]
and X3[x31 = 0.652, x32 = 0.234, x33=0.114]. The computed posterior probabilities for the Military
Operational Effects nodes M1 , M2, M3 and M4 are: M1[m11 = 0.480, m12 = 0.386, m13 = 0.134],
M2[m21 = 0.283, m22 = 0.198, m23 = 0.296, m24 = 0.223], M3[m31 = 0.408, m32 = 0.295, m33 =
0.297] and M4 [m41 = 0.418, m42 = 0.103, m43 = 0.114, m44 = 0.365]. Posterior distribution results
for the Tactical Effects nodes T1 , T2 and T3 are: T1[ t11 = 0.576, t12 = 0.112, t13 = 0.312], T2[t21 =
0.409, t22 = 0.311, t23 = 0.280], and T3[t31 = 0.692, t32 = 0.308]. Posterior beliefs for the entire
Network are displayed in graphical format under the “Bayesian Graphs” data field as displayed
as shown in Figure 18. The posterior probability of each state of variable (textual result) is
displayed by a bar chart under the variable node.
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Several simulation runs were performed to test the model. A simulation run consisted of
mapping of the level 1 Strategic Effects (Y), the level 2 Political Operational Effects (X), the
level 3 Military Operational Effects (M), and the level 4 Tactical Effects (T). Dimensionally, the
simulation space was an Y * X* M * T design. The complexity of the Network was determined
by the number of elements in Y, X, M, and T respectively. In this case Y = 12, X = 10, M = 14,
and T = 8, there were 13,440 possible trial runs by the BAMSS model. However, the mappings
were also realized through probabilistic decision nodes. The minimum number of experiments
were then equal to 1 (assume Y = 1, X = 1, M = 1, T = 1). Hence, the probabilistic (expected)
number of experiments depended on the user’s input and could be constrained by 1 ≤ NE ≤ #E
where, #E = Y * X * M * T, and at least one Y, X, M, or T had elements greater than 1. For the
simulation runs discussed in the next section new evidence was introduced to nodes selected
randomly for each variable level. Belief Updating was performed and the results of the updating
for all the nodes were recorded. Four simulations were conducted, one for each level of network
variables for a total of 44 simulation experiments.
4.3.2 Evidence Propagation in the Bayesian Network
Posterior distributions were obtained for different variables in the Network using random
input evidence for different simulated scenarios. The hierarchical BBN was initialized with prior
probabilities for the parent nodes and prior conditional probabilities for all the child nodes at
each Network level and loaded into the model. A node was randomly in the Network was
randomly selected and used as an input node for new evidence introduced into the model. With
the input evidence varying from 0.1 to 0.9 in the range [0, 1], several simulation runs were
performed on the model and the posterior belief distribution for each value of input evidence
recorded. With these simulations experimental data were collected and used to evaluate the
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robustness of the model as well as validation for accuracy. Some simplifications were made for
purposes of demonstration such as the completeness of the CPT specification in the model. In
practice however, it is extremely difficult to fill the CPTs with appropriate numbers. With large
datasets, it is possible to learn the CPTs from real world data (Neapolitan, 2004).
In the asymmetric warfare domain, such data is difficult to access because of restrictions
imposed by national security concerns. Tables 10-17 show the posterior belief distributions from
the experimental simulation. These distributions represent the updated Beliefs for the nodes in
the Network as new evidence is introduced. The propagation of the new evidence at all levels of
the network nodes is shown graphically in Figures 19, 20, and 21. Sample statistics are displayed
for each simulation run showing the mean belief accrual and the standard deviation per value of
input evidence for all the variables at the selected level.
Table 10
Belief Update in Level 1(Strategic Effects) Nodes
Simulation
Run
Input
Variable
X1=x11
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.5
0.7
0.8
0.9

Posterior Belief
Strategic Effects
y22
y31
y32

y11

y12

y13

y14

y21

0.19
0.19
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.21

0.46
0.45
0.42
0.40
0.36
0.34
0.32

0.26
0.27
0.29
0.30
0.32
0.34
0.35

0.09
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.12

0.60
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.59
0.61

0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.39

0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.29

0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30

y33

y41

y42

y43

0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40

0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30

0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.40

0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30

In Table 10, variables Y3 and Y4 exhibit steady state values of posterior probabilities for
all values of the input variable X1 . To explain this behavior, we examine the CPTs and in
particular, the priors of Y3 and Y4 and prior conditionals such as P(X1 = x11 |Y3 = y33) or P(X1 =
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x11 |Y4 = y41). X1 = x11 represented the factor Sectarian Identity while Y4 = y41 represented the
factor Nationalism. The expression P(X1 = x11 |Y4 = y41) or P(Nationalism| Sectarian Identity)
could not be defined in the context of the problem. These inadmissible combinations led to
oversampling by the algorithm resulting into steady state values of posterior probabilities and
incompatible hypotheses. Table 11 shows a statistical analysis of the posterior belief distribution.
The sample size refers to the total state space in Table 10 while the mean evidential accrual and
the standard deviation are derived from the posterior distribution of Table 10.
Table 11
Statistical Analysis of Posterior Belief Distribution of Level 1 Nodes
Simulation Run

Posterior Belief

Input Variable
X1=x11
0.1

Sample Size

Mean

Std. Deviation

12

0.333

0.125

0.2

12

0.333

0.124

0.4

12

0.334

0.119

0.5

12

0.333

0.117

0.7
0.8
0.9

12
12
12

0.333
0.332
0.332

0.113
0.111
0.113

Table 12 shows the posterior belief distribution for the level 2 (Political Operational Effects)
evidence nodes with the statistical analysis in Table 13.The variable X2 = x24 exhibits steady state
values for all the simulation runs. During network development, the prior conditional P(X2 = x24 |
M2 = m 22) was set at 20%. Contextual analysis showed that the expression P(X2 = x24 | M2 = m 22)
= 0.20 was not admissible contributing to the steady state values for the variable.
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Table 12
Belief Update in Level 2(Political Operational Effects) Nodes
Simulation
Run
Input
x11
Variable
M2=m 22
0.38
0.1
0.40
0.2
0.42
0.4
0.43
0.5
0.45
0.7
0.45
0.8
0.46
0.9

x12
0.27
0.24
0.19
0.16
0.12
0.10
0.09

x13
0.35
0.37
0.40
0.41
0.43
0.44
0.45

Posterior Belief
Political Operational Effects
x21
x22
x23
x24
0.24
0.24
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25

0.41
0.40
0.40
0.40
0.39
0.39
0.39

0.22
0.22
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.23

0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13

x31
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50

x32
0.20
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.22
0.22

x33
0.29
0.29
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28

Table 13
Statistical Analysis of Posterior Belief Distribution in Level 2 Nodes
Simulation Run

Posterior Belief

Input Variable
M2=m 22
0.1

Sample Size

Mean

Std. Deviation

10

0.301

0.107

0.2

10

0.300

0.110

0.4

10

0.302

0.116

0.5

10

0.300

0.119

0.7
0.8
0.9

10
10
10

0.299
0.299
0.300

0.128
0.131
0.135

Table 14 shows the posterior belief distribution for the level 3 (Military Operational Effects)
nodes. Evidence in the input variable T3 = t31 was varied from 0.1 to 0.9 and the posterior
probabilities for all the M nodes, recorded. The posterior belief for node M2 = m22 and M2= m23
did not change with variations in the input variable. Table 15 shows the statistical analysis with
the mean evidential accrual at 0.29 for all the simulation runs.
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Table 14
Belief Update in Level 3 (Military Operational Effects) Nodes
Simulation
Run
m11
Input
Variable
T3=t31
0.60
0.1
0.55
0.2
0.47
0.4
0.44
0.5
0.39
0.7
0.37
0.8
0.35
0.9

Posterior Belief
Military Operational Effects
m12

m13

m21

m22

m23

m24

m31

m32

m33

m41

m42

m43

m44

0.25

0.15

0.94

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.47

0.26

0.27

0.44

0.13

0.20

0.23

0.28

0.17

0.93

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.47

0.27

0.27

0.43

0.13

0.20

0.25

0.33

0.20

0.93

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.46

0.27

0.27

0.41

0.12

0.19

0.28

0.35

0.21

0.93

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.46

0.27

0.27

0.41

0.12

0.19

0.29

0.38

0.23

0.93

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.45

0.27

0.27

0.40

0.12

0.18

0.30

0.39

0.24

0.93

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.45

0.27

0.28

0.39

0.12

0.18

0.31

0.40

0.25

0.93

0.02

0.03

0.02

0.45

0.28

0.28

0.39

0.12

0.18

0.32

Table 15
Statistical Analysis of Posterior Belief Distribution in Level 3 nodes
Simulation Run

Posterior Belief

Input Variable
T3=t31
0.1

Sample Size

Mean

Std. Deviation

14

0.286

0.246

0.2

14

0.287

0.238

0.4

14

0.286

0.231

0.5

14

0.286

0.229

0.7
0.8
0.9

14
14
14

0.285
0.286
0.287

0.227
0.227
0.226

Table 16 shows the posterior belief distribution for the level 4 (Tactical Effects) nodes. Evidence
in the input variable M4 = m41 was varied from 0.1 to 0.9 and the posterior probabilities for all
the T nodes recorded. Table 17 shows the statistical analysis of the posterior belief distribution.
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Table 16
Belief Update in Level 4(Tactical Effects) Nodes
Simulation
Run
Input
t11
Variable
M4=m 41
0.57
0.1
0.57
0.2
0.56
0.4
0.56
0.5
0.56
0.7
0.58
0.8
0.56
0.9

t12

t13

0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11

0.32
0.32
0.32
0.32
0.33
0.30
0.32

Posterior Distribution
Tactical Effects
t21
t22
t23
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.41
0.40
0.40
0.39

0.31
0.31
0.31
0.31
0.31
0.32
0.31

0.28
0.28
0.29
0.29
0.29
0.28
0.28

t31

t32

0.70
0.70
0.70
0.70
0.69
0.69
0.69

0.30
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.31
0.31
0.31

Table 17
Statistical Analysis of Posterior Belief Distribution in Level 4 Nodes
Simulation Run

Posterior Belief

Input Variable
M4=m 41
0.1

Sample Size

Mean

Std. Deviation

8

0.375

0.172

0.2

8

0.375

0.172

0.4

8

0.375

0.170

0.5

8

0.375

0.170

0.7
0.8
0.9

8
8
8

0.375
0.374
0.371

0.166
0.171
0.167

The posterior probabilities of randomly selected network variables were plotted against
the probability of evidence of a select input variable to show the propagation of evidence through
the network. For each plot, a random variable from each level of the hierarchical network was
selected and its posterior probability plotted for each simulation run.
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The results of the evidence propagation (belief revision) for the selected variables in the network
are shown and discussed below.

Figure 19. Belief revision in nodes Y1 = y11 , X1 = x11 and T3 = t32 after new evidence is introduced
in node M1 = m11 .
In this sensemaking vignette, the hypothesis variable is Y1 = y12 (Law and Order
Breakdown) and the informational variables are X1 = x11 (Sectarian Identity) and T3 = t32
(Infrastructure Sabotage). New evidence was introduced in node M1 = m11, the Insurgent
Security Target Engagement. Figure 19 shows the posterior probability distribution of nodes
after seven simulation runs. We noted the strong positive correlation (r = 0.883) between the
evidence of attacks on security targets (Insurgent Security Target Engagement) and the targeted
action (Infrastructure Sabotage). By inspection, as there was more evidence on security target
engagement, there was an observable marginal increase in breakdown in law and order,
increasing sabotage of infrastructure, and a decreasing trend in sectarian identity. The last node
indicated the possibility of no evidence of the groups responsible for sabotage to national
infrastructures. The minor variability in the posterior distribution for variable Y1 = y12 (Law and
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Order Breakdown) would seem to indicate that evidence introduced in the variable node M1 =
m11 was non informative, meaning that it did not significantly impact the hypothesis variable Y1.

Figure 20. Belief revision in nodes Y2 = y22 , M1 = m11 and T2 = t21 after new evidence is
introduced in node X3 = x33.
For the second sensemaking vignette, the hypothesis variable was selected as Y2 = y22
(Insurgent ideology) and the informational variables were M1 = m11 (Insurgent Security Target
Engagement) and T2 = t21 (Insurgent Small Arms Attacks). New evidence was introduced in node
X3 = x33 (Intelligence Asymmetry). Figure 20 shows the posterior probability distribution of the
variables after 7 simulation runs. We observed that when evidence for the input variable (X3 =
x33) was set to 70%, the posterior probabilities for nodes M1 = m11, Y2 = y22, and T2 = t21
converged supporting the hypothesis of an attack on security targets such as police and military
leaders using small arms. Increasing the advantage of intelligence asymmetry was noninformative on the selected variables. In addition, it seemed that as the reliability of intelligence
increased (x33), security target engagement decreased (r = -0.987). Under the same scenario,
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support for the insurgent ideology remained fairly constant. Correlation analysis for the selected
variables is shown in appendices B, C, and D.

Figure 21. Belief revision in nodes X2 = x22, Y4 = y41 and M2 = m23 after new evidence is
introduced in node T3 = t32.
In the last sensemaking vignette, we considered the hypothesis variable Y4 = y41 the
insurgent concept of Nationalism. For informational variables, we set X2 = x 22 (Insurgent
Modular Operations) and M2 = m23 (Civilian Shelters). New evidence was introduced into
variable T3 = t32 (Arson). Figure 21 shows the posterior probability distributions after 7
simulation runs. The hypothesis variable Y4 = y41 recorded the highest evidential accrual as new
evidence was introduced to T3 = t32. The wider implication of this was to identify most arson
attacks and property destruction in that particular area of operations as being carried out by the
local population angered or motivated by nationalistic feelings. It was also easy to conclude that
the probability distributions for X2 = x22 (Insurgent Modular Operations) and M2 = m23 (Civilian
Shelters) were almost non-informative, or had no effect on whether arson occured or not.
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4.3.3 Inference and Courses of Action Analysis
To analyze the potential courses of action, we consider the results from sensemaking
vignettes discussed in section 4.3.2.
1. Insurgent Security Target Engagement (M1=m11).
a) By examining the evidence propagation in Figure 19, P(Law and Order Breakdown) remains
relatively stable at 40% with increasing evidence of the adversary targeting of the
counterinsurgent security personnel. P(Law and Order Breakdown) refers to the probability
of disrupting counterinsurgent control of the local security situation by limiting their ability
for military maneuvers and restricting interaction with the population in stability and support
operations. The relative stability of the posterior belief distribution implies that the causal
effect of this variable is limited hence it does not carry much weight as a course of action.
b) The probability that the Insurgent Security Target Engagement as a mode of operation is
influenced by Sectarian Identity (X1= x11) decreases from 50% to 30% as evidence of
Insurgent Security Target Engagement increases from 0.1 to 0.9. This implies that operations
against security personnel cannot be attributed to a particular group. Infact focusing on the
sectarian identity of the group is detrimental to the course of action selection because of the
negative correlation. This effect should therefore be discarded.
c) P(Infrastructure Sabotage| Insurgent Security Target Engagement) increases from 20% to
40% as the evidence of Insurgent Security Target Engagement increases from 0.1 to 0.9.
Increase in infrastructure sabotage is the most likely tactical effect of the increase in
Insurgent Security Target Engagement probably due to the vacuum created by this particular
military operational effect. The COA would require the commander to increase protection for
critical infrastructure and security targets
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2. Insurgent Intelligence Asymmetry (X3 = x33).
a) P(Insurgent Security Target Engagement| Intelligence Asymmetry) decreases from 60%
to 35% as evidence for intelligence asymmetry increases from 0.1 to 0.9. Intelligence
asymmetry refers to insurgents evolving new tactics that strain or defeat the
counterinsurgent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (IS&R) assets. This
implies that better intelligence by the insurgent group may not directly influence this
mode of operation. The insurgents may in fact be using the intelligence to select soft less
protected targets instead of security personnel. The commanders COA is to invest more
resources in recruiting intelligence assets to counteract the asymmetry.
b) P(Small Arms Attacks| Intelligence Asymmetry) shows minor variability at 40% similar to
the P(Insurgent Ideology|intelligence asymmetry). The tactical effect Small Arms Attacks
is not significantly influenced by the insurgent intelligence assets. Both these effects are
inadmissible as COA.
3. Tactical Effect Arson (T3 = t32).
a) P(Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) decreases from 50% to 40% (approximately)
with increase in evidence of Arson as a tactical effect from 0.1 to 0.9. Probability of the
insurgent concept of Nationalism increases from 30% to 40% while the P(Civilian
Shelters| Arson) remains constant at 30%. Most arson attacks and property destruction in
a particular area of are carried out by the local population .The commanders’ COA
should be to consider the tactical effect as a reflection of nationalistic feelings and take
appropriate measures in the PMESII spectrum to address this effect. The first and the last
probability expressions are inadmissible for COA analysis.
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Table 18 gives a summary of the Network’s inferential conditions and the supportable courses of
action for the evidence propagation results.
Table 18
Summary of Inferential Conditions and Courses of Action for Sample Sensemaking Tasks
Inferential Condition

P(Law and order| Insurgent
Security Target Engagement)

Conditional
Probability
of Evidence
(%)
40

Course of
Action

Not
supported

P(Sectarian
Identity|Insurgent Security
Target Engagement)
P(Infrastructure Sabotage|
Insurgent Security Target
Engagement)

50→30

Not
supported

20→40

Weakly
supported

P(Insurgent Security Target
Engagement| Intelligence
Asymmetry)

60→35

Strongly
supported

P(Small Arms Attacks|
Intelligence Asymmetry)
P(Insurgent ideology|
Intelligence Asymmetry)
P(Insurgent Modular
Operations| Arson)

40

Not
admissible
Not
admissible
Weakly
supported

P(Nationalism|Arson)

30→40

Strongly
supported

P(Civilian Shelters|Arson)

30

Not
admissible

40
50→40

Results Interpretation

Insufficient evidence to show that
insurgent attacks on coalition
security targets are the cause of the
breakdown in law and order
Operations against coalition
security targets cannot be
attributed to a particular group
Increase in infrastructure sabotage
may be a second order effect of
targeting security because of the
security gaps created.
Insurgents may be using the
intelligence advantage to select
soft targets and avoid the hard
security targets
The inferential condition is
incompatible with the hypothesis
The inferential condition is
incompatible with the hypothesis
Consider incidents of arson as
effects of operational modularity
by the insurgents.
Consider the tactical effect arson
as a reflection of nationalistic
feeling by the local population.
The inferential condition is
incompatible with the hypothesis

4.3.4 Discussion
The probability distributions for Strategic Effects provide an insight into the end state of
the adversary. By performing the inference at this level, an analyst can reasonably draw
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conclusions about both the short term and long term objectives or goals of an adversary. For
example, considering Figure 19, the correlation between an increase in attacks on the security
targets (Security Target Engagement) and the targeted action (Infrastructure Sabotage) should
prompt more defensive resource allocations for critical infrastructures. Additionally, the
observable marginal increase in the breakdown in law and order may imply the necessity to
deploy more security forces in the affected areas with the resultant effects on manpower
requirements.
The probability distributions for Operational Effects (Military and Political) give the
analyst inference on the areas of focus that will enable the adversary to achieve their desired
Strategic Effects. From the simulation experiment (Figure 20), the strong evidence of small arms
attacks (a targeted action) against security targets may require a change in force protection
conditions, for example necessitating convoy protection and reduced foot patrols in the affected
areas.
Probability distributions for Tactical Effects provide inference into the actual methods,
techniques, tactics, and procedures that the adversary may employ to attack selected targets. In
Figure 21, the analyst may note the rise in nationalistic or sectarian sentiment and the
corresponding increase in cases of arson. Arson as a weapon is more effectively employed by the
local population. It can be inferred then, that this tactical effect is being carried out by segments
of the population sympathetic to the insurgent goals by linking them to nationalist ideals.
Depending on the complexity of the asymmetric battlespace, the potential range of
Tactical Effects is quite extensive and diverse. For purposes of simplicity only a few effects were
modelled in the Network. With these probabilities, the analyst could infer the likelihood of a
specific attack mode, target type, whether or not the target would be attacked based on its
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symbolic or iconic value, whether it would be a single attack or a set of coordinated attacks and
the relative location of the attack. It should be emphasized that the importance of these posterior
belief distributions lies in the threat levels posed by each variable and not so much the specificity
of the actual numbers.
4.4 Model validation
4.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analyses were performed on BAMSS to demonstrate its robustness and
efficacy in responding to probability changes in information. The purpose of sensitivity analysis
in this research is to enable the analyst to see the various effects of high influence variables or
events based on their occurrence probabilities on the overall battlefield information. A good
discussion on the methodology for sensitivity analysis in Bayesian Networks can be found in
Woodberry et al. (2004; 2007). For the BAMSS Network, target nodes representing Tactical
Effects were selected and the probability of each of the parent nodes representing the Strategic
Effects was varied over the [0,1] probability space by directly introducing evidence while
keeping all the other nodes fixed. Changes in the target nodes were then observed and plotted
graphically.
Table 19
Probability of New Evidence Introduced in the Network
Simulation
Run
Run #
y11
0.2
1
0.4
2
0.6
3
0.8
4
0.9
5

y12
0.4
0.5
0.1
0.7
0.8

y13
0.6
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.3

y14
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5

y21

Input evidence
Strategic Effects
y22
y31
y32

0.99
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

0.8
0.7
0.6
0.4
0.3

0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.9

0.1
0.4
0.5
0.7
0.9

y33
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.2
0.1

y41
0.5
0.4
0.8
0.3
0.2

y42
0.9
0.1
0.4
0.5
0.3

y43
0.7
0.8
0.2
0.6
0.5

89
Table 20
Posterior Probability of Target Nodes
Simulation
Run
Run#
t11
0.57
1
0.56
2
0.54
3
0.55
4
0.53
5

t12
0.11
0.09
0.13
0.10
0.08

t13
0.32
0.31
0.28
0.25
0.29

Posterior belief
Tactical Effects
t21
t22
0.41
0.40
0.42
0.39
0.36

0.31
0.30
0.30
0.32
0.33

t23
0.29
0.28
0.28
0.26
0.31

t31
0.7
0.69
0.72
0.66
0.74

t32
0.30
0.30
0.28
0.34
0.26

Figure 22. Sensitivity of posterior probabilities for Tactical Effects T1 = t11, T1 = t12 and T1 = t13:
Parent node Y1 = y12 is varied.
In the sensitivity analyses of the Tactical Effects node T1 (t11, t12, and t13) it was observed
that the BAMSS model did not significantly respond to changes in parent variable Y1 = y12 (Law
and Order Breakdown). It is simplistic to argue that the Tactical Effects (t11, t12 and t13) have
very little influence on the breakdown in the security situation as the sensitivity charts portray. A
reasonable explanation would be that the causal linkage is tenuous and needs to be redefined
during the development of the network topology. Further examination of the sensitivity analysis
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charts indicates that the posterior distributions of the effects t11, t12 and t13 are mutually exclusive
on the effect y12. The posterior probability of T1 = t11 is the highest for every level of input
peaking at 58% implying that civilian suicide bombing is the most prevalent tactical effect for
the insurgent group. With evidence for law and order breakdown greater than 70%, there is a
marked increase in incidents of remotely detonated IEDs (T1 = t12). Correspondingly, there is a
drop in the probability of firing RPGs (T1 = t13).

Figure 23. Sensitivity of posterior probabilities for Tactical Effects T2 = t21, T2 = t22 and T2 = t23:
Parent node Y4 = y42 is varied.
In the second simulation, a sensitivity analysis was applied to the node Y4 = y42 (Sectarian
Violence) by varying the input (evidence) to the node, keeping all the other nodes fixed and
observing the variations in the posterior distributions of the target nodes. In the results shown in
Figure 23, node T2 = t22 (Coercive Threats) and T2 = t23 (Convoy Ambushes) displayed low
sensitivity to the evidence variation while node T2 = t21 (Small Arms Attacks) showed an increase
in the posterior probabilities accompanied by steeper changes. An examination of the sensitivity
charts revealed that the posterior distributions of effects Coercive Threats (T2 = t22) and Convoy

91
Ambushes (T2 = t23) co-existed indicating the possibility of some interaction effects. The most
significant changes occurred in the effect Small Arms Attacks which recorded the highest
posterior probability (0.43) for the input variable.
Lastly, sensitivity analysis was done for target nodes T2 = t23 (Convoy Ambushes), T3 = t31
(Infrastructure sabotage), and T3 = t32 (Arson), varying the inputs and keeping all the other nodes
fixed. The results were plotted in Figure 24. The posterior distribution for Infrastructure
Sabotage recorded the highest sensitivity (0.75) to the input variable Y2 = y22 (Insurgent
Ideology).

Figure 24. Sensitivity of the posterior probabilities for Tactical Effects node T2 = t23, T3 = t31 and
T3 = t32 : Parent node Y2 = y22 is varied.
Additional examination of Figure 24 also revealed that the posterior distribution for effects
Infrastructure Sabotage and Arson were mutually exclusive, indicating some interaction effects
between the two factors. The response trajectory for t23 and t31 is the same for changes in y22
although the magnitude was different. This could imply strong causal linkages between the two
effects. When the input evidence was varied between 0.1 and 0.4, both effects showed a negative
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gain response. When the input range increased beyond 0.4, both displayed a positive gradient,
peaking at 0.72 for t31 and 0.29 for t23.
4.4.2 Inference and Courses of Action Analysis
Sensitivity analysis allows the commander to infer about the levels of uncertainty for the
select hypothesis variables. It also allows analysts to perform a what-if analysis to assess the
effects of the likelihood of the target variables. In the sensemaking vignettes used in this
simulation, we varied the hypothesis nodes and observed the uncertainty concerning the tactical
effects nodes. P(Law and Order |High Level Attrition Attacks) did not show significant variation
to changes in input evidence from 0.1 to 0.9. P(Civilian Suicide Bombing) showed the highest
posterior belief accrual peaking at 58% demonstrating that the new evidence on this variable
could confirm the most likely posteriori hypothesis (Y1 = y12). On average, P(Remotely
Detonated IEDs|Law and Order Breakdown) was 10% while P(Rocket Propelled Grenades|Law
and Order Breakdown) was 28%. Summarizing from these statistics, the commander should
consider variables with posterior distributions that exhibit the greatest variation in response to
changes in the input variable for additional analysis.
From Figure 23, P(Small Arms Attacks| Sectarian Violence) recorded the highest
aposteriori probability at 44%. A COA analysis by the commander requires a closer examination
of the differences between t22 (Coercive Threats, 30%) and t23 (Convoy Ambushes, 30%) which
seemed to exhibit interaction effects. From Figure 24, Infrastructure Sabotage recorded the
highest variations and posterior belief at 75% as evidence in the input variable Y2 = y22
(Insurgent Ideology) was varied from 0.1 to 0.9. The high degree of sensitivity to the variation in
input should prompt the commander to perform additional what-if analyses to identify additional
causal factors. Similar analysis could be extended to P(Convoy Ambush| Sectarian Violence) and
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P(Arson| Sectarian Violence), both with average aposteriori probability of 30% since they
exhibit mutually exclusive behavior. Table 21 gives a summary of the inferential conditions and
the courses of action for the sensitivity analysis results.
Table 21
Summary of Sensitivity Analysis Inferential Conditions and Courses of Action
Inferential Condition

P(Civilian Suicide
Bombing|Law and order
Breakdown)

Conditional
Probability of
Evidence (%)
55

Course of
Action
Strongly
supported

P(Remotely Detonated
IEDs|Law and Order
Breakdown

10

Weakly
supported

P(Rocket Propelled
Grenades|Law and
Order Breakdown
P(Small Arms Attacks|
Sectarian Violence)

28

Weakly
supported

44

Strongly
supported

P(Coercive Threats|
Sectarian Violence

30

Additional
analysis

P(Convoy
Ambushes|Sectarian
Violence)
P(Infrastructure
sabotage|Sectarian
Ideology)

30

Additional
analysis

75

Strongly
supported

P(Convoy
Ambush|Sectarian
Ideology)
P(Arson |Sectarian
Ideology)

30

Additional
analysis

30

Additional
analysis

Results Interpretation

Law and order breakdown is likely
to occur 55% of the time because
of suicide bombing of civilian
targets
Remotely denotated IEDs are not a
major contributing factor to the law
and order breakdown (only 10% of
the time)
Rocket Propelled Grenades is not a
significant contributory factor to
law and order breakdown
Evidence supports the increase in
the use of small arms as a targeted
action in sectarian violence
No conclusive evidence to support
this COA. Additional analysis
needed.
No conclusive evidence to support
this COA. Further analysis is
needed to isolate the causal factors
Strong evidence to show that the
ideology of the insurgents is linked
to attacks on certain critical
infrastructure.
No conclusive evidence to support
this COA. Further analysis is
needed to isolate the causal factors
No conclusive evidence to support
this COA. Further analysis is
needed to isolate the causal factors
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4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presented experiments and validations of the BAMSS model using a case
study in asymmetric warfare. Some examples on using BAMSS for sensemaking in the context
of the simulation experiment were presented. We developed and analyzed different vignettes
representative of the asymmetric warfare domain. In the first vignette, the sensemaking task
required an analyst to create a hypothesis variable Y1 = y12 where y12 represented Law and Order
Breakdown. New evidence was then introduced in the node M1 = m11, where m11 was an indicator
for the Security Target Engagement by varying the input data from 0.1 to 0.9. Results from seven
simulation runs were then analyzed for select informational variables X1 = x11 (Sectarian Identity)
and T3 = t32 (Infrastructure Sabotage).
By examining the evidence propagation in the first vignette, the probability of (Law and
Order Breakdown) remained relatively stable at 40% with increasing evidence of adversary
targeting of the counterinsurgent security personnel. The relative stability of the posterior belief
distribution implied that the causal effect of this variable was limited hence did not carry much
weight as a COA. The probability that the Insurgent Security Target Engagement as a mode of
operation as influenced by Sectarian Identity (X1= x11) decreased from 50% to 30% implying
that operations against security personnel could not be attributed to a particular group. In fact,
focusing on the sectarian identity of the group could be detrimental to the course of action
selection because of the negative correlation and this effect ought to be discarded. Probability of
(Infrastructure Sabotage| Insurgent Security Target Engagement) increased from 20% to 40%.
Increase in infrastructure sabotage was the most likely tactical effect of the increase in Insurgent
Security Target Engagement probably due to the vacuum created by this particular military
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operational effect. This COA would require the commander to increase protection for critical
infrastructure and security targets.
For the second vignette, the hypothesis for the sensemaking task was changed to Y2 = y22
(Insurgent ideology). Evidence was introduced in node X3 = x33 (Intelligence Asymmetry) and the
posterior probabilities for informational variables M1 = m11 (Security Target Engagement) and T2
= t21 (Small Arms Attacks) were computed. Probability of (Insurgent Security Target
Engagement| Intelligence Asymmetry) decreased from 60% to 35% as evidence for intelligence
asymmetry increased from 0.1 to 0.9. This implied better intelligence by the insurgent group did
not directly influence this mode of operation. The commander’s COA would be to invest more
resources in recruiting intelligence assets to counteract the asymmetry. Probability of (Small
Arms Attacks| Intelligence Asymmetry) showed minor variability at 40% similar to the
P(Insurgent Ideology|intelligence asymmetry). The tactical effect Small Arms Attacks was not
significantly influenced by the insurgent intelligence assets. Both these effects were inadmissible
as COA.
In the last sensemaking vignette, we considered the hypothesis variable Y4 = y41, the
insurgent concept of Nationalism. For informational variables we set X2 = x22 (Insurgent Modular
Operations) and M2 = m23 (Civilian Shelters). New evidence was introduced into variable T3 = t32
(Arson). The probability of (Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) decreased from 50% to 40%
(approximately) with an increase in evidence of Arson as a tactical effect from 0.1 to 0.9. The
probability of Nationalism increased from 30% to 40% while the P(Civilian Shelters| Arson)
remained constant at 30%.The commanders’ COA would then be to consider the tactical effect
as a reflection of nationalistic feelings and take appropriate measures in the PMESII spectrum to
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address this effect. P(Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) and P(Civilian Shelters| Arson)
were not admissible for COA analysis.
A sensitivity analysis was performed on the model output for the second sensemaking
problem using three simulation experiments. The first experiment entailed the selection of target
nodes representing Tactical Effects variable T1 (t11, t12, and t13). The probability of (Law and
Order |High Level Attrition Attacks) did not show significant variation to changes in input
evidence from 0.1 to 0.9. P(Civilian Suicide Bombing) showed the highest posterior belief
accrual peaking at 58% demonstrating that the new evidence on this variable could confirm the
most likely aposteriori hypothesis (Y1 = y12). On average, P (Remotely Detonated IEDs|Law and
Order Breakdown) was 10% while P(Rocket Propelled Grenades|Law and Order Breakdown)
was 28%. The commander would consider the variable Civilian Suicide Bombing for additional
analysis since it exhibited the greatest variation in response to changes in the input variable.
In the second simulation, a sensitivity analysis was performed on variable T2 (t21, t22, t23),
varying the input to node Y4 = y42 (Sectarian Violence). P(Small Arms Attacks| Sectarian
Violence) recorded the highest aposteriori probability at 44%. A COA analysis by the
commander would require a closer examination of the differences between t22 (Coercive Threats,
30%) and t23 (Convoy Ambushes, 30%) which seemed to exhibit interaction effects. Lastly,
sensitivity analysis was done for target nodes T2 = t23 (Convoy Ambushes), T3 = t31 (Infrastructure
sabotage), and T3 = t32 (Arson). Infrastructure Sabotage recorded the highest variations and
posterior belief at 75% as evidence in the input variable Y2 = y22 (Insurgent Ideology) was varied
from 0.1 to 0.9. Additional analysis could be extended to P(Convoy Ambush| Sectarian Violence)
and P(Arson| Sectarian Violence) both with average aposteriori probability of 30% since they
exhibited mutually exclusive behavior.
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CHAPTER 5
Optimizing Abductive Inference in BAMSS with Genetic Algorithm
5.1 Genetic Algorithms
The Bayesian Clustering Algorithm (Lauritzen &Spiegelhalter, 1988) described in
Chapter 4 has limitations in terms of resource utilization and the bounded search space. The
BAMSS model overcomes these limitations by using the GA, thereby increasing its efficiency,
scalability and robustness. A GA is a variable search procedure that is based on the principle of
evolution by natural selection (Goldberg, 1989). The procedure works by evolving sets of
variables (Chromosomes) that fit certain criteria from an initial random population via cycles of
differential replication, recombination and mutation of the fittest chromosomes.
GAs have several advantages over other methods. Conventional search methods are not
robust, as discussed in Goldberg (1989). GAs improve over the local scope of traditional
methods by searching in parallel many subspaces in multidimensional spaces with complex
topologies. Under time constraints, enumerative approaches are often not feasible or too slow.
Goldberg notes that GAs differ from other methods in the following ways: 1) GAs work with a
coding of the parameter set, not the parameters themselves; 2) GAs search from a population of
points, not from a single point; 3) GAs use an objective function without any auxiliary
knowledge; and 4) GAs use probabilistic transition rules, not deterministic rules. A population
representing candidate solutions is evaluated for fitness using a fitness function. Genetic
operators such as crossover and mutation then create a new population from the old population.
The probability of transfer of the genetic material of an individual is a function of its fitness.
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Previous research on the use of GAs for BN inference has been done by Rojas-Guzman
and Kramer (1993, 1996); Gelsema (1995); Lin et al., (1990); Santos, Shimony and Williams
(1996); and Welch (1996). de Campos et al., (1999, 2002) did extensive research on partial
abductive inference in Bayesian Belief Networks using GAs. By focusing only on a subset of
network variables (partial abduction) known as the explanation set, de Campos et al. were able to
solve the maximum a posteriori (MAP) probability problem using approximate GA algorithms.
Mengshoel (1998) used GA in function optimization (finding the most probable explanation)
focusing particularly on the role of niching and scaling to solve the problems of premature
convergence and diversity preserving. This was followed by research in using GAs with
probabilistic crowding replacement for fast and efficient search to perform Network inference
(1999). A good review of evolutionary algorithms in Bayesian network learning and inference
tasks is provided by Larranaga, et al., (2013)
5.1.1 Representation
In GAs, a solution or individual is conventionally represented by a string of integers or
chromosomes which encodes the individual genotype. Each position or gene in the string
corresponds to one variable in the belief network. Each gene can take a number of values
(alleles) from a finite discrete alphabet which may be different for each gene and corresponds to
the number of discrete values that the variable can assume in the Belief Network.
GAs require the existence of a metric in the space of possible solutions. In this case, a
clearly defined metric is the absolute probability of each possible solution (or point in the search
space or system state in the BN space).Within the Belief Network framework, performing this
calculation is straightforward for the special case in which all the nodes have been instantiated.
The fitness metric corresponds to the individual phenotype and is a product with one factor for
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each node. Each factor is either a prior probability for parent nodes or a conditional probability
(for child nodes). These probabilities are efficiently retrieved using multidimensional arrays. A
phenotype (fitness metric or probability) corresponds to each genotype (set of variable-value
assignments).
5.1.2 Parameters
BAMSS requires the specification of two GA parameters; the probability of Crossover
and the probability of Mutation. Crossover (reproduction) is the GA operator that enables
reproduction between two parents to create new members of the population from the previous
generation. Two parents can create one or two children in the case where a choice is necessary to
avoid losing useful new individuals in the resultant population. The genotype of each new
individual is made up by combining the genotypes of the parents. In traditional GAs, where two
parents are copied into two children, two positions are randomly chosen in the new strings and
the genes located between the two positions are interchanged.
The mutation operator introduces random changes in one allele of the genotype of one
individual. The mutation frequency is usually very low and its goal is to maintain diversity in the
population to avoid premature convergence. A BN can be used for predictive reasoning or
diagnostic abductive inference in which case, any arbitrary subset of variables may be
instantiated during the inference process. The instantiated values are not changed by the mutation
to guarantee that all individuals retain legal and meaningful genotypes.
5.1.3 Fitness Function
The Bayesian Network Inference Algorithm computes the probability density over a
variable H given new evidence D formally denoted as P(H|D).The two abductive inference tasks
in the BN are belief updating and belief revision. Belief updating computes the posterior belief
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over a hypothesis node H given instantiated evidence nodes D1 , D2 …Dm as identified by
P(H|D1 =d1,D2 =d2,…Dm =dm). Belief revision computes the posterior belief over a set of
hypothesis nodes H1 ,H2..Hk given the evidence nodes D1, D2 …Dm, more formally written as
P(H1,H2 …Hk |D 1=d1,D2 =d2,…Dm=dm). For the case where all nodes are instantiated, belief
revision is known as computing an explanation and the task of computing the Most Probable
Explanation (MPE) or the k Most Probable Explanations (kMPE) is referred to as abductive
inference in the model. The following definitions related to the BAMSS model are made:
Definition 1
The posterior probability P(h|D) of a network variable as defined by equation(1) in Chapter 3 is
computed as follows:

P( h | D) 

P ( D | h) P ( h)
P( D)

The fitness function to be used then is based on the posterior probability P(h|D) of the Network
as defined above. Let all the explanations be ordered according to their posterior probability:
P(h1|d)≥ P(h2|d)≥P(h3 |d)≥…..P(hn|d)

(16)

Here, the most probable explanation (MPE) is h1. The k most probable explanations (k-MPE) are
h1, h2,…hk (k≤n). The experimental population consists of a set of explanations or chromosomes
{ h1, h2,…hn} where n is the population size. The objective is to obtain the posterior probabilities
of a set of variables (X1,X2,..Xn ) that can be regarded as influencing a particular effect, for
example, the probability that insurgents adopt certain Tactical effects given that we can infer
their Sectarian Identity and the Fundamentalist Ideology they adhere to. The overall joint
probability of the set of variables is given by the product
n

P( X 1 , X 2 ,..., X n )   P( xi |  X i )
i 1

(17)
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The fitness function is a simple look-up function that computes the overall joint probability of
the network (known as the network solution) for different combinations of variables and returns
MPE for the Network based upon a user selected fitness value. Formally, the fitness function for
BAMSS model can be represented as:
n

fitness ( X i )  arg max Xi  P( xi |  X i )
i 1

(18)

where 𝑋𝑖 is the set of all the variables in the network and the right hand side returns the
maximum argument of the product term. Owing to the ability of the GA to undertake parallel
search, multiple network solutions compliant with the fitness value (kMPE) may be generated
and its left to the analyst to evaluate the probability profile of each of the solutions for the best
COA selection. The combination of variables in the network solution (MPE) constitutes the
phenotype of interest to the analyst.
Definition 2
Since a BN is a directed acyclic graph, a topological sort can be used to linearly order the
nodes in a BN and a GA string (chromosome) is organized according to the linear order. Let
𝑋𝑗 = 𝑥𝑗 be the assignment to node j in the BN. If all the nodes are binary, i.e 𝑥𝑗 ∈ {0, 1} then the
one to one mapping from the random variable Xj to the chromosome aj in position j is fully
defined by the vector aj where aj is a string of zeros and ones for example [10011011101]. In the
case of the BAMSS model, the random variables have cardinality greater than 2 i.e, 𝑥𝑗 ∈
{0,1,2. . 𝑛 } where n represents the nth state of the higher cardinality alphabet hence, more
appropriately we define the vector string aj as a string of real valued integers.
[0112211220102112] is an example of a string where the nth state of alphabet is represented by
the integer 2 in a string of cardinality 3.
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5.2 Implementing the Genetic Algorithm in BAMSS
A schematic representation of the information flow and processing in GA is shown in
Figure 25.

Figure 25. The canonical GA procedure as applied to the BAMSS model.
The initial step involves a generation of a population of chromosomes (random variable sets).
Each chromosome in the population is then evaluated according to a user selected fitness value.
If the chromosome has a score higher than a set threshold value (τ*), this chromosome is selected
and the procedure stops. The chromosome is then decoded for its real value (phenotype) and
output by the model as the MPE for the set of random variables.
If the chromosome has a lower score than τ*, the chromosomes are reproduced
proportional to their fitness to create a new population. Chromosomes with a higher fitness score
will reproduce more numerous offspring. In the crossover stage, the genotype of the replicated
parents is combined by randomly selecting two parent chromosomes and swapping their genetic
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information. In this way, two new chromosomes are created adding to the range of possible
solutions to the Network. To avoid premature convergence of the solutions, mutations are
introduced in the chromosomes randomly to diversify the gene pool. Mutation also ensures that
the entire state space is searched. The newly created population is then re-evaluated again using
the fitness function and the fittest individuals selected. This cycle (also called a generation) is
repeated until a predefined threshold is met.
The pseudo code for the canonical genetic algorithm or Simple Genetic Algorithm
(Goldberg, 1989; Mengshoel, 1999) is described below:

Figure 26. A simple genetic algorithm (Mengshoel, 1999).
Note that maxgen is the iteration threshold and the outermost loop is repeated until this
threshold is reached. For each generation, the GA functions select, crossover, mutate and the
objective function objfunc are iterated. select(pop) selects an individual from the input
population. P(crossover) takes chromosomes chrom1 and chrom 2 as input and creates new
chromosomes as output by crossing over with a probability P(crossover). P(Mutation) mutates
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each allele in the chromosome (chrom) and then returns a mutated chromosome. Objfunc refers
to the objective function which is used for computing the fitness of the two new individuals.
Decode maps the genotype to a phenotype (real value) of the chromosome. The fitness function
objfunc takes a value from the phenotypic space and assigns it a fitness value.
5.3 BAMSS Analysis with GA
5.3.1 Data Encoding and Input for Simulation
Chromosomes in a BBN network are represented using real integers instead of binary
encodings. The reason for selecting higher order cardinality alphabet is because of: 1) The
complex nature of the problem which makes binary encodings infeasible and 2) Research by
Antonise (1989), Bhattacharyya and Koehler (1994), and Davis (1991) which shows that higher
cardinality alphabets provide better results. We used the BAMSS COA Analysis network
developed in the GeNIe Network module to evaluate the model GA. The node probabilities were
obtained by querying the Bayesian Inference module while belief updating was done using the
Bayesian Clustering Algorithm implementation. Discrete states of each node in the network
corresponding to the states of a selected random variable and their corresponding prior and
conditional probabilities were encoded as shown in Tables 22-25.
Since Level 1 nodes are parent nodes, Table 22 gives the marginal distribution of all the
variables that constitute that level.
Table 22
Level 1 Nodes Chromosome Encoding
Y1
1
2
3
4

P(Y1)
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.1

Y2
1
2

P(Y2)
0.6
0.4

Y3
1
2
3

P(Y3)
0.3
0.3
0.4

Y4
1
2
3

P(Y4)
0.2
0.6
0.2
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Tables 23-25 give the conditional distribution of the rest of the informational variables in the
Network. Since all Level 2, Level 3 and Level 4 variables are child nodes, the conditional
dependencies must be encoded as shown. For ease of computation, it is assumed that all the
variables have non-zero conditional probabilities and non-zero mutual information.
Table 23
Level 2 Nodes Sample Chromosome Encoding
X1
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2

Y1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4

Y2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Y3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Y4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

P(X1|Y1Y2Y3Y4)
0.45
0.30
0.62
0.80
0.78
0.19
0.55
0.45
0.88
0.34
0.70

X2
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3

Y1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3

Y2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Y3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Y4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

P(X2|Y1Y2Y3Y4)
0.50
0.80
0.60
0.35
0.80
0.70
0.37
0.23
0.40
0.20
0.92

Table 24
Level 3 Nodes Sample Chromosome Encoding
M1
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2

X1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1

X2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2

X3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

P(M1|X1X2X3)
0.60
0.40
0.54
0.90
0.62
0.10
0.33
0.85
0.70
0.30
0.85

M2
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2

X1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1

X2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2

X3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

P(M2|X1X2X3)
0.22
0.43
0.60
0.50
0.88
0.15
0.23
0.54
0.34
0.65
0.45
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Table 25
Level 4 Nodes Sample Chromosome Encoding
T1
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2

M1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1

M2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2

M3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

M4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

(P(T1|M1M2M3M4)
0.45
0.30
0.62
0.80
0.78
0.19
0.55
0.45
0.88
0.34
0.70

T2
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2

M1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1

M2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2

M3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

M4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

P(T2|M1M2M3M4)
0.20
0.67
0.32
0.89
0.45
0.60
0.55
0.70
0.10
0.50
0.45

The complete state of the Network can thus be represented by a chromosome of 50 genes,
each gene representing a network variable. The chromosome is a configuration of all the network
variables, represented as a string of integers and it encapsulates the conditional probability of a
variable in a given state. Considering the rows in Tables 22-25, a sample population of five
chromosomes representing the complete state of the network is represented as follows:
𝒀𝟏 𝒀𝟐 𝒀𝟑 𝒀𝟒 𝑿𝟏 𝑿𝟐 𝑿𝟑 𝑴𝟏 𝑴 𝟐 𝑴𝟑 𝑴𝟒 𝑻𝟏 𝑻𝟐 𝑻𝟑
1111 11111 11111 11111 1111 1111 1111 1111 11111 11111 11111
2111 21111 21111 21111 2111 2111 2111 2111 21111 21111 21111
3111 31111 31111 31111 3111 3111 3111 3111 31111 31111 12111
4111 12111 41111 12111 1211 4111 1211 4111 12111 12111 22111
[ 1211 22111 12111 22111 2211 1211 2211 1211 22111 22111 13111 ]
Note that the gene position in the chromosome array represents the actual order of the variable
nodes in the topology of the network. The phenotype for these chromosomes is decoded to the
following linearly ordered array:
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𝒀𝟏 𝒀𝟐 𝒀𝟑 𝒀𝟒 𝑿𝟏 𝑿𝟐 𝑿𝟑 𝑴𝟏 𝑴 𝟐 𝑴𝟑 𝑴𝟒 𝑻𝟏 𝑻𝟐 𝑻𝟑
0.5 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.45 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.22 0.47 0.75 0.5 0.2 0.8
0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.43 0.82 0.62 0.8 0.67 0.15
0.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.62 0.8 0.5 0.54 0.6 0.23 0.9 0.33 0.32 0.88
0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.35 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.45 0.89 0.55
[ 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.78 0.8 0.6 0.62 0.88 0.2 0.7 0.65 0.45 0.8 ]
Considering only the first two levels of the model with seven nodes (Level 1 and Level 2 nodes)
the search space comprises of {(𝑌1 )4 ∗ (𝑌2 )2 ∗ (𝑌3 )3 ∗ (𝑌4 )3 ∗ (𝑋1 )3 ∗ (𝑋2 )4 ∗ (𝑋3 )3 } =2592
points .With each gene having two or more discrete values (alleles) the search space for all
possible combinations of variables in the Network is exponentially large making abductive
inference in such a network to be considered an NP-hard problem (Shimony, 1994).
The GA used in the BAMSS model development was implemented in Java using the
JAGA API. JAGA runs on Java version 1.4 and higher and is freely available under the GNU
General Public License Version 2.0. After downloading the appropriate libraries, an executable
.jar file was developed in the NetBeans IDE and modified for the fitness function and other
problem-specific GA operators. For the standalone GA module, the original version was
developed in the Python 2.7 programming language in order to better capture the graphical
results of the GA. The graphical library used is Pyside, a python version of QT4. The jpype
library was used to interface with the smile.jar library in the main BAMSS model. The plot
graphing was done using pyqtgraph, which required NumPy and SciPy as dependencies. All
development was done in the IDE.
5.3.2 Experimental Evaluation
The BAMSS Network described in Chapter 4 is used to evaluate the model using the
BAMSS- GA. The Network consists of 14 variables each of which has 2, 3 or 4 different states.
The pseudo code for the BAMSS GA algorithm is described in Figure 27 and a sample Javabased implementation algorithm is given in Figure 28.
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Figure 27. BAMSS genetic algorithm.
// GA algorithm work
Configuration gaConfig=new DefaultConfiguration();
DefaultConfiguration.reset();
// Adding mutation and crossover
GeneticOperator gcr=new CrossoverOperator(gaConfig,pcr, true);
GeneticOperator gmr=new GaussianMutationOperator(gaConfig,pmt);
gaConfig.addGeneticOperator(gcr);
gaConfig.addGeneticOperator(gmr);

IChromosome chromosome=new Chromosome(gaConfig,new DoubleGene(gaConfig,0,
1),14);

gaConfig.setSampleChromosome(chromosome);
gaConfig.setPopulationSize(populationSize);
gaConfig.setFitnessFunction(new ByesianNetworkFitness(fitnessValue));
Population pop=new Population(gaConfig, populationSize);
for(int c=0;c<populationSize;c++)
{
Gene[]gene=chromosome.getGenes();
Gene[]newGene=new Gene[gene.length];
for(int j=0;j<gene.length;j++)
{
newGene[j]=gene[j].newGene();
newGene[j].setAllele(cbMatrix[c][j]);
}
IChromosome chrom = new Chromosome(gaConfig);
chrom.setGenes(newGene);
pop.addChromosome(chrom);
}
logger.info("Gene initialisation completed");
// Now we need to construct the Genotype.
Genotype genotype=new Genotype(gaConfig, pop);

Figure 28. Sample Java code for BAMSS-GA implementation.
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The termination condition is a user-defined fitness value which specifies the probability
of the Network solutions that we are interested in or the maximum number of generations that is
set for algorithmic computations. Any solution that does not meet the stopping criterion is
discarded by the model and does not appear in the output results. For BAMSS simulation
experiments, a fitness value of 70% was used for all the experimental configurations. A common
problem with GA is that it does not provide a window into the piecewise examination of the
output. This makes the interpretation of the results challenging. To overcome this challenge, a
decode function was added to convert the genotype to the phenotype for output interpretation. .
This is shown in the algorithm in Figure 29.
public class GAResult
{
private int generation;
private double fitnessValue;
private String geneCombination;
public int getGeneration() {
return generation;
}
public void setGeneration(int generation) {
this.generation = generation;
}
public double getFitnessValue() {
return fitnessValue;
}
public void setFitnessValue(double
fitnessValue) {
this.fitnessValue = fitnessValue;
}
public String getGeneCombination() {
return geneCombination;
}
public void setGeneCombination(String
geneCombination) {
this.geneCombination = geneCombination;
}
}

Figure 29. Sample Java code for decoding the BAMSS-GA genotype.
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5.3.3 Simulation Results
Three simulation runs were performed, varying the algorithm parameters for each run.
For each simulation, the GA parameters were set as shown in Table 26.
Table 26
GA Parameters for Three Simulation Experiments

The initial population was entirely randomized for a faster convergence to a good solution.
Following de Campos et al. (1999) we added a parameter for probability of transition (selection)
to ensure the diversity of the population and avoid convergence to local optima. By setting the
probability to 50%, we ensured that the best 50% of the chromosomes were carried over from the
initial population to the population at the next generation. The probability of crossover ensured
that 49% of the new population is selected by crossover. The choice of the parent to be selected
for crossover was proportional to the fitness of that parent. The final 1% of the new population
was selected by mutation. The chromosomes to be mutated were selected randomly from the
initial population, mutated with a given probability of mutation and copied into the new
population.
The algorithm terminated when the stopping criterion (20 generations) had been reached.
The desired number of network solutions (k) was set to 20 so that the model would output 20
MPEs for the network. Figure 30 shows the interface for the GA standalone module of BAMSS
with the parameter input menu displayed.
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Figure 30. Graphical user interface for the BAMSS-GA module.
The complete GA processing returned a table with the k most probable network states as
shown in Figure 31. The first column here, represents the probability of the selected MPE
defined as the probability that the network will be in the chosen state. The second column is the
genotype, a string representation of the MPE where each gene represents a specific node in the
network (random variable) and the outcome of that node. The third column is the graphical
representation of the phenotype, showing all the nodes in the appropriate state. Each node has the
state of the random variable set according to the genotype of the MPE.
Belief Updating and Abductive Inference is performed when the user selects the
phenotype of the MPE. The resultant Network and posterior probabilities are displayed as shown
in Figure 32. The kMPEs are stored in a sensemaking database and when appropriately selected
are loaded into BAMSS by the “Select Model File” command in the BAMSS GUI. When new
evidence is available, inference is performed using the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm as
described in Chapter 4.
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Figure 31. The kMPE output of the BAMSS-GA module.
Figure 32 shows the network view of the phenotype of the selected MPE. Clicking on the view
button shows one global view of the MPE.

Figure 32. Network view of the phenotype of a selected MPE.
The BAMSS-GA GUI allows the user to plot and graphically evaluate the evolution of
the fitness value of the selected solution(s) in each generation. Figure 33 shows the evolution of
probabilities over all the generations for the best, the worst and the average solutions. The green
line represents the best solutions while the red line represents the worst solutions. The average of
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the two populations represents the convergence trend towards an optimal solution and is
represented by the blue line. This is a graphical representation of how the algorithm search
process refines the results pool over each generation and how fast it converges towards the
optimal result.
The best solution follows a logarithmic growth curve, increasing rapidly for the first 10
generations before flat lining to a constant level. The maximum probability is reached at the 10 th
generation. The average solution asymptotically approaches the best solution, converging after
15 generations. The worst solution of the network is a non-monotonic with oscillations of
significant amplitude especially after 10 generations. The oscillations of the fitness (probability)
of the solutions in each generation indicate that the algorithm is sampling from a diverse
population and this is a desirable feature for the model to achieve better results. The probability
of the MPE is plotted on the y-axis while the iteration or generation number is plotted on the xaxis.

Figure 33. Evolution of fitness for the best, average and worst solutions of the BAMSS COA
Analysis network for experiment 1.Green = best solution, Blue = average, Red = worst solution.
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The effects of varying the GA parameters for the second and third simulations are shown
in Figure 34. The most significant effect is the faster convergence to an optimal Network
solution. The population diversity is increased due to an increase in the probability of mutation
and hence, the convergence of the algorithm to an optimal solution is faster. The behavior of the
worst individuals is also significantly improved with fewer oscillations due to the diverse
sampling population. The probability of the MPE is plotted on the y-axis while the iteration or
generation number is plotted on the x-axis.

Figure 34. Effects of varying the GA parameters on the network solution probability for
experiment 2(top) and experiment 3(bottom).Green = best solution, Blue = average solution, Red
= worst solution.
Table 27 is a summary of the probability of the best, average, and worst network
solutions obtained for each of the three trials. A result for only the first 10 generations are shown
since convergence to the best solution occurs after about 10 generations. The genotype for the
kMPEs is [02110110000000] which is decoded to the phenotype [Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21, Y3 = y33, Y4 =
y42; X1 = x11, X2 = x22, X3 = x32; M1 = m11, M2 = m21 , M3 = m31, M4 = m41 ; T1 = t11, T2 = t21, T3 = t31].
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Table 27
Probability of MPE for the Simulation Experiments

Gen
#
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Experiment 1
P (MPE)
Best
Average
3.44E-06
4.01E-06
5.73E-06
5.73E-06
5.73E-06
6.30E-06
7.59E-06
1.12E-05
1.12E-05
1.12E-05
1.19E-05

1.03E-09
4.90E-09
3.40E-08
1.15E-07
2.00E-07
6.24E-07
1.48E-06
2.06E-06
2.62E-06
3.45E-06
5.27E-06

Worst
1.65E-07
2.48E-07
5.19E-07
9.39E-07
1.61E-06
2.64E-06
3.65E-06
4.62E-06
5.74E-06
7.03E-06
8.31E-06

Experiment 2
P(MPE)
Best
Average

Gen
#
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

2.25E-06
4.50E-06
4.50E-06
4.50E-06
1.02E-05
1.02E-05
1.02E-05
1.12E-05
1.12E-05
1.19E-05
1.19E-05

1.87E-09
3.20E-09
4.31E-08
9.19E-08
2.20E-07
2.65E-07
7.17E-07
8.38E-07
8.94E-07
2.23E-06
1.52E-06

Worst
1.83E-07
2.98E-07
5.91E-07
1.04E-06
1.69E-06
2.61E-06
3.75E-06
5.19E-06
6.50E-06
7.71E-06
8.89E-06

Gen
#
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Experiment 3
P(MPE)
Best
Average
3.89E-06
3.89E-06
3.89E-06
4.00E-06
5.76E-06
9.81E-06
9.81E-06
9.81E-06
9.81E-06
1.19E-05
1.19E-05

3.76E-09
2.73E-09
3.23E-08
1.02E-07
1.49E-07
2.09E-07
3.92E-07
6.79E-07
1.51E-06
1.51E-06
1.23E-06

Worst
1.65E-07
2.59E-07
5.20E-07
9.42E-07
1.51E-06
2.29E-06
3.32E-06
4.45E-06
5.78E-06
6.90E-06
8.06E-06

Table 28 shows the comparison of performance gains for BAMSS-GA compared to BAMSS for
the three experiments. Seven simulations were performed for each experiment and the MPE for
each run selected. The corresponding genotype of each MPE is shown in the second column. For
all the simulation runs, each variable of the network was set to a specific state which was held
constant across all the trials. The probability of evidence for BAMSS (Bayesian Clustering
Algorithm) and BAMSS-GA was then computed.
Table 28
Performance Comparison for BAMSS and BAMSS-GA

P (MPE)
BAMSS

Experiment 1
MPE
P(MPE)
Genotype
BAMSSGA

Experiment 2
MPE
P (MPE)
Genotype
BAMSSGA

Experiment 3
MPE
P(MPE))
Genotype
BAMSSGA

1.508E-08
8.639E-09
7.999E-09
7.251E-09
7.504E-09
5.823E-09
8.446E-09

02110110000000
10000100000000
10000100000000
10002100200000
10000100000000
10002100300000
10000100300000

02110110000000
10000100000000
10000100000000
10000100000000
10000100200000
10000100300000
10000100300000

02120110000000
10000100300000
10000101000000
10002110000000
10000110000000
10000110300000
10000110000000

1.193E-05
4.789E-05
4.543E-05
4.227E-05
5.602E-05
4.849E-05
4.873E-05

1.193E-05
4.789E-05
4.543E-05
4.693E-05
5.038E-05
5.385E-05
4.874E-05

8.951E-06
3.369E-05
3.724E-05
3.672E-05
4.866E-05
4.678E-05
3.963E-05
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The results of these simulations are displayed graphically in Figures 35-38.To make the
charts readable, a logarithmic scale was used for the probability of the network solution denoted
as P(MPE) or simply as P(e).
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Figure 35. Comparison of performance gains for BAMSS-GA for Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
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Figure 36. Performance gains for BAMSS-GA compared to BAMSS for Experiment 1.
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Figure 37. Performance gains for BAMSS-GA compared to BAMSS for experiment 2.
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Figure 38. Performance gains for BAMSS-GA compared to BAMSS for experiment 3.
5.4 Discussion
The results shown in the preceding section show that the BAMSS-GA is able to find the
kMPEs for the Network in a fast and an efficient manner. The probabilities presented in Table 27
represent the probabilities of obtaining Network solutions of that configuration. These
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probabilities are also displayed in the first column of Figure 31. For each experiment, the
probabilities of 10 Network solutions are presented along with the optimal solution. To each
solution, there exists a specific genotype corresponding to the combination of variables that can
produce the solution as displayed in the second column of Figure 31. The genotype for the
kMPEs is [02110110000000] which is decoded to the phenotype [Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21, Y3 = y33, Y4 =
y42; X1 = x11, X2 = x22, X3 = x32; M1 = m11, M2 = m21 , M3 = m31, M4 = m41 ; T1 = t11, T2 = t21, T3 = t31].
From the phenotype, the extracted hypotheses for the MPE are Y1 = y12 (Law and Order
Breakdown); Y2 = y21 (Sectarian Governance Structures), Y3 = y33 (Disruption of Civic and
Governance Processes) and Y4 = y42 (Sectarian Violence).
A comparison of performance gains obtained by using BAMSS-GA is shown in Table
28. Using the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm (Chapter 4), each simulation can only return one
probability of the Network solution. An advantage of using GA, as shown in Tables 27 and 28 is
that each simulation returns more than one Network solution as well as the optimal Network
solutions based on the user defined parameters. If the analyst is interested in 20 solutions with a
fitness value of, say 70%, the only input needed is the parameter specification. The output results
will contain 20 Network solutions with a 70% probability of occurring given the evidence as
well as the probability and genotype of the optimal Network solution.
For COA analysis, the states of the variables for the three experimental configurations in
the simulation were set as follows: The hypothesis variable Y1 was set to state y13 (Insurgent
Control of the Population).Similarly Y2 = y21 (Sectarian governance structures), Y3 = y32
(Insurgent control of the security space), and Y4 = y41 (Nationalism).The informational variables
were set as follows: X1 = x11, X2 = x23, X3 = x32 , M1 = m12,M2 = m23,M3 = m33 ,M4 = m42, T1 = t12 , T2
= t23 and T3 = t32 . For experiment 1, using BAMSS-GA, the probability of obtaining an MPE is
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4.227E-05 with the genotype [10002100200000] corresponding to phenotypes: Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21,
Y3 = y31, Y4 = y41; X1 = x13, X2 = x22, X3 = x31; M1 = m11 , M2 = m24, M3 = m31 , M4 = m41; T1 = t11 , T2 =
t21, T3 = t31.
For illustration purposes, assume that the following hypotheses are under consideration
by the commander: Y1 = y13 (Insurgent Control of the Population), Y2 = y21 (Sectarian
Governance Structures), Y3 = y32 (Insurgent Control of the Security Space) and Y4 = y41
(Insurgent Nationalism). From the simulation results, considering only the Y1 hypothesis
variable, the MPE is Y1 = y12 (breakdown in law and order) and not the initial hypothesis state y13
(Insurgent Control of the Population). The change in the hypothesis state is supported by
explanatory variables X3 |x32→x31 (Unbounded Battlespace), M1 |m12 →m11 (Insurgent Security
Target Engagement). For experiment 2, the probability of the MPE is 4.693E-05 with a
corresponding genotype, [10000100000000]. The informational variable changes from X1 = x13 to
X1 = x11 meaning the most probable state of the Network is to be reached if we consider the
insurgent political operational effect to be Sectarian Identity (X1 = x11) rather than the Legitimacy
of Jihad (X1 = x13). Additionally the tactical effect changes from T3 = t32 (Infrastructure
Sabotage) to T3 = t31 (Arson). The commander will therefore have to give more weight to this
evidence variable for detail planning by, for example, increasing force levels in areas where
critical infrastructure such as dams or power stations are located or deploying surplus units.
For experiment 3, the probability of the MPE is 3.672E-05 with a genotype,
[10002110000000].The evidence variable X3 = x31 (Unbounded Battlespace) changes to X3 = x32
(Techniques, Tactics and Procedures). In this case a change in the counterinsurgent force tactics
may be required to counteract the insurgents who operate with highly dispersed and
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decentralized command and control structures. The commander may have to consider these
changes in the Political Operational Effects to inform the select hypotheses.
Using the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm, the probability for getting an MPE with the
Network evidence set as previously described is 7.251E-09. Note that the probability of
obtaining the Network solution, P(MPE) decreases by an order of magnitude (103 ) due to the
inherent limitations of the clustering algorithm. In general, from the kMPEs output from
BAMSS-GA, the analyst can select an MPE for a COA analysis. When new evidence is
introduced in the evidence variables of the network, the Bayesian Clustering Algorithm is then
applied and the posterior belief distribution of the hypothesis variables or the target variables of
interest is computed as discussed in Chapter 4.
5.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter described the optimization of abductive inference in BAMSS using a
Genetic Algorithm. The problem of Abductive Inference was presented as one of finding the
most probable explanation or the MPEs of a Bayesian Network. Three simulation runs were
conducted, varying the GA parameters for each run. For the first experiment, the probability of
crossover was set to 0.49 while the probability of mutation was set at 0.01. The probability of the
best network solution (MPE) was 1.19E-0.5 for the genotype [02110110000000] with a
corresponding phenotype [Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21, Y3 = y33, Y4 = y42; X1 = x11, X2 = x 22, X3 = x32; M1 =
m11, M2 = m21, M3 = m31 , M4 = m41; T1 = t11 , T2 = t21, T3 = t31]
For the second experiment, the parameters were varied with the probability of crossover
= 0.4 and the probability of mutation = 0.1. By comparing the best results for each experiment in
Table 27 using the P(MPE) or P(e) as the comparison metric, this experimental configuration
yielded 30% better network solutions due to the population diversity introduced by the increase
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in the probability of mutation. The third simulation experiment with P(Crossover) = 0.35 and
P(Mutation) = 0.15 did not show much improvement in the quality of the solutions implying that
the best parameter setting had been exceeded.
For COA analyses, the states of the variables for all the experimental configurations in
the simulation were set as follows: The hypothesis variable Y1 was set to state y13 (Insurgent
Control of the Population).Similarly Y2 = y21 (Sectarian governance structures), Y3 = y32
(Insurgent control of the security space), and Y4 = y41 (Nationalism).The informational variables
were set as follows: X1 = x11, X2 = x23, X3 = x32 , M1 = m12, M2 = m23, M3 = m33 , M4 = m42, T1 = t12,
T2 = t23 and T3 = t32 . Tables 29-31 give the summary and comparisons of the outcomes of the
experiments. The most probable hypothesis and the explanatory variables are highlighted.
Table 29
Experiment 1: Probability of Crossover = 0.49, Probability of Mutation = 0.01, Number of
Generations=20, k MPEs=20
Genotype Input

Hypothesis
Input nodes

10100211221121 Y1 = y13
Y2 = y21
Y3 = y32
Y4 = y41

Input
Output
Informational Hypothesis
Variables
nodes
X1 = x11
Y1 = y12
X2 = x23
Y2 = y21
X3 = x32
Y3 = y31
M1 = m12
Y4 = y41
M2 = m23
M3 = m33
M4 = m42
T1= t12,
T2 = t23,
T3 = t32

Best
Explanatory
Variables
X1 = x11,
X2 = x23,
X3 = x31,
M1= m11,
M2 = m24
M3 = m31
M4 = m41
T1 = t11,
T2 = t21,
T3 = t31

Network
Efficiency

Comments

85% →17
out of 20
plausible
network
solutions
better than
BAMSS

Most
probable
hypothesis
is
Breakdown
in Law and
Order, y12
not
Insurgent
Control of
the
Population,
y13.
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Table 30
Experiment 2: Probability of Crossover = 0.40, Probability of Mutation = 0.10, Number of
Generations=20, k MPEs=20
Genotype Input

10100211221121

Hypothesis
Input nodes
Y1 = y13
Y2 = y21
Y3 = y32
Y4 = y41

Input
Informational
Variables
X1 = x11
X2 = x23
X3 = x32,
M1 = m12
M2 = m23
M3 = m33
M4 = m42
T1= t12
T2 = t23
T3 = t32

Output
Hypothesis
nodes
Y1 = y11
Y2 = y22
Y3 = y31
Y4 = y41

Best
Explanatory
Variables
X1 = x13
X2 = x22
X3 = x31
M1= m11
M2 = m21
M3 = m31
M4 = m41
T1 = t11
T2 = t21
T3 = t31

Network
Efficiency

Comments

95%→ 19
out of 20
plausible
network
solutions
better than
BAMSS

X1 = x13 to
X1 = x11: the
insurgents
are using
Sectarian
Identity (X1
= x11) rather
than the
Legitimacy
of Jihad (X1
= x13) as the
political
operations
effect.

Table 31
Experiment 3: Probability of Crossover = 0.35, Probability of Mutation = 0.15, Number of
Generations=20, k MPEs=7
Genotype Input

10100211221121

Hypothesis
Input
Input nodes Informational
Variables
Y1 = y13
X1 = x11
Y2 = y21
X2 = x23
Y3 = y32
X3 = x32
Y4 = y41
M1 = m12
M2 = m23
M3 = m33
M4 = m42
T1= t12
T2 = t23
T3 = t32

Output
Hypothesis
nodes
Y1 = y11
Y2 = y22
Y3 = y31
Y4 = y41

Best
Explanatory
Variables
X1 = x12
X2 = x22
X3 = x32
M1= m11
M2 = m21
M3 = m31
M4 = m41
T1 = t11
T2 = t21
T3 = t31

Network
Efficiency

Comments

70%→14
out of 20
plausible
network
solutions
better than
BAMSS

X3 = x31
Unbounded
Battlespace
changes to
X3 = x32
Techniques,
Tactics and
Procedures
. Probable
COA is to
consider
changes in
coalition
TTPs
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Comparison of performance gains for BAMSS-GA and BAMSS was performed using the
same experimental setup. Using P(MPE) as the comparison metric, the results showed that
Bayesian Network inference using BAMSS-GA produced better network solutions than BAMSS
by an order of magnitude (103 ). The network view of the computed MPE gave a representation
of the network nodes with evidence set to the state of the solution. The phenotype of this
representation was a network with a global state of the computed posterior probabilities. When
the network was loaded into BAMSS, the computed posterior probabilities became priors and
prior conditionals. When new evidence was introduced into the network, the Bayesian Inference
algorithm was applied and the updated posterior beliefs of the hypothesis variables or target
variables of interest were computed.
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CHAPTER 6
Observations, Conclusions and Future Research
6.1 Summary
Chapter one offers a general introduction to the research topic, the problem statement, the
research goals and objectives, the challenges encountered in the research and the general
contribution to the scientific body of knowledge. Chapter two reviews both the qualitative and
analytical models of sensemaking. From the qualitative analyses, most researchers have focused
on the aspect of cognition where the primary sensemaking task is to construct a meaningful
mental representation of the problem space. Schema-driven representation, mental models, and
other cognitive constructs dominate the process models of sensemaking that have been
discussed. These models give an understanding of the meta-cognitive and cognitive acts that
inform the sensemaking process and determine how they may be applied to understand and
overcome the cognitive limitations of the human mind. The limitations of this approach lie
primarily in the lack of a unifying paradigm of sensemaking. An additional challenge exists in
knowing how to use information gained from these models to develop a unifying framework or
provide standardized guidance for the development of better sensemaking support systems.
Research on sensemaking analytics is presented as a tool to support the sensemaking
process. In this approach, sensemaking models are defined as computational cognitive models
whose primary task is to enable processing of information to achieve an understanding of the
problem space and facilitate an effective analysis process. Most of the models discussed have
been developed for the fields of intelligence analysis, information foraging and knowledge
management. The diversity of approaches advocated provides challenges in developing a unified
sensemaking process. A critical look at the tools developed does point to one aspect: the gradual
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shift from decision support tools to sensemaking support tools. Sensemaking support tools focus
on augmenting the cognitive capability of the sense-maker during the whole process of
sensemaking.
This research uses the tool-based approach for two reasons: First, advances in the field of
Computational Intelligence have led to the development of powerful and efficient algorithms and
methods that can be used to computationally simulate some processes in sensemaking. For
example, it is possible to represent sensemaking models in software and cognitive architectures.
The algorithms can simplify the process of sensemaking tasks in context. Second, through the
use of computational techniques such as Bayesian Networks and Abductive Inference, both the
qualitative and quantitative approaches can be combined to provide a better representation of a
sensemaking process.
Chapter three discusses Bayesian Formalism for representing sensemaking information.
The Bayesian Belief Network reflects a person’s belief about the state of a variable in the real
world through the use of joint probability distributions over the variables. Bayesian Networks are
presented as normative cognitive models that support sensemaking under uncertainty. The
networks are shown to support reasoning about evidence and actions not easily handled by other
competing computational models. In a Bayesian Belief Network, inference is undertaken by
abduction. This means that we infer from effects to the best explanation of those effects. This
reflects the behavior of a sensemaking problem. A forward (top-down) inference was shown to
support prospective sensemaking, while a backward (bottom-up) inference supported
information fusion in retrospective sensemaking.
Chapter four discusses the development experiments and validations of the BAMSS
model using a case study in asymmetric warfare. Vignettes representative of a sensemaking task
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in the asymmetric warfare domain were developed and used for analyses. In the first vignette, the
sensemaking task required an analyst to create a hypothesis variable Y1 = y12 where y12
represented Law and Order Breakdown. New evidence was then introduced in the node M1 =
m11, where m11 was an indicator for the Security Target Engagement by varying the input data
from 0.1 to 0.9. Results from seven simulation runs were then analyzed for the informational
variables X1 = x11 (Sectarian Identity) and T3 = t32 (Infrastructure Sabotage).
Examining the evidence propagation in the first vignette, the probability of (Law and
Order Breakdown) remained relatively stable at 40% with increasing evidence of adversary
targeting of the counterinsurgent security personnel. The relative stability of the posterior belief
distribution implied that the causal effect of this variable was limited hence does not carry much
weight as a COA. The probability that the Insurgent Security Target Engagement as a mode of
operation was influenced by Sectarian Identity (X1= x11) decreased from 50% to 30% .This
would imply that operations against security personnel could not be attributed to a particular
group. In fact, focusing on the sectarian identity of the group could be detrimental to the course
of action selection because of the negative correlation and this effect then, ought to be discarded.
The probability of (Infrastructure Sabotage| Insurgent Security Target Engagement) increased
from 20 to 40%. An increase in infrastructure sabotage was the most likely tactical effect of the
increase in insurgent security target engagement probably due to the vacuum created by this
particular military operational effect. This COA would require the commander to increase
protection for critical infrastructure and security targets.
For the second vignette, the hypothesis for the sensemaking task was changed to Y2 = y22
(Insurgent ideology). Evidence was introduced in node X3 = x33 (Intelligence Asymmetry) and the
posterior probabilities for informational variables M1 = m11 (Security Target Engagement) and T2
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= t21 (Small Arms Attacks) were computed. The probability of (Insurgent Security Target
Engagement| Intelligence Asymmetry) decreased from 60 to 35% as evidence for intelligence
asymmetry increased from 0.1 to 0.9. This implied that better intelligence by the insurgent group
was not a direct influence on this mode of operation. The commander’s COA could likely invest
more resources in recruiting intelligence assets to counteract the asymmetry. Probability of
(Small Arms Attacks| Intelligence Asymmetry) showed minor variability at 40% similar to the
P(Insurgent Ideology|intelligence asymmetry) . The tactical effect Small Arms Attacks was not
significantly influenced by the insurgent intelligence assets. Both these effects were however,
inadmissible as courses of action.
In the last sensemaking vignette, we considered the hypothesis variable Y4 = y41, the
insurgent concept of Nationalism. For the informational variables we set X2 = x22 (Insurgent
Modular Operations) and M2 = m23 (Civilian Shelters). New evidence was introduced into
variable T3 = t32 (Arson). The probability of (Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) decreased
from 50 to 40% (approximately) with an increase in evidence of Arson as a tactical effect from
0.1 to 0.9. The probability of Nationalism increased from 30 to 40% while the P(Civilian
Shelters| Arson) remained constant at 30%. The commanders’ COA could be to consider the
tactical effect as a reflection of nationalistic feelings and take appropriate measures in the
PMESII spectrum to address this effect. P(Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson) and P(Civilian
Shelters| Arson) were not admissible for COA analyses.
A sensitivity analysis was performed on the model output for the second sensemaking
support demonstration using three simulation experiments. In the first experiment, target nodes
representing Tactical Effects variable T1 (t11, t12, and t13) were selected. The probability of (Law
and Order |High Level Attrition Attacks) did not show significant variation to changes in input
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evidence from 0.1 to 0.9. P(Civilian Suicide Bombing) showed the highest posterior belief
accrual peaking at 58% demonstrating that the new evidence on this variable could confirm the
most likely aposteriori hypothesis (Y1 = y12). On average, P(Remotely Detonated IEDs|Law and
Order Breakdown) was 10% while P(Rocket Propelled Grenades|Law and Order Breakdown)
was 28%. In general, the commander could consider the variable Civilian Suicide Bombing for
additional analysis since it exhibited the greatest variation in response to changes in the input
variable.
In the second simulation, a sensitivity analysis was performed on variable T2 (t21, t22, t23),
varying the input to node Y4 = y42 (Sectarian Violence). P(Small Arms Attacks| Sectarian
Violence) recorded the highest aposteriori probability at 44%. A COA analysis by the
commander required a closer examination of the differences between t22 (Coercive Threats,
30%) and t23 (Convoy Ambushes, 30%) which seemed to exhibit interaction effects. Lastly,
sensitivity analysis was done for target nodes T2=t23 (Convoy Ambushes), T3=t31 (Infrastructure
sabotage), and T3= t32 (Arson). Infrastructure Sabotage recorded the highest variations and
posterior belief at 75% as evidence in the input variable Y2 = y22 (Insurgent Ideology) was varied
from 0.1 to 0.9. The high degree of sensitivity to the variation in input could prompt the
commander to perform additional what-if analyses to identify more causal variables. Similarly,
for P(Convoy Ambush| Sectarian Violence) and P(Arson| Sectarian Violence), both had an
average aposteriori probability of 30% since they exhibited mutually exclusive behaviors.
Chapter five described an optimization of Abductive Inference in BAMSS using a
Genetic Algorithm(GA) and simulation experiments to find the most probable explanations
(MPEs). Three simulation runs were conducted, varying the GA parameters for each run. For the
first experiment, the probability of crossover was set to 0.49 while the probability of mutation
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was set at 0.01. The probability of the best network solution (MPE) was 1.19E-0.5 for the
genotype [02110110000000] with a corresponding phenotype [Y1 = y12, Y2 = y21, Y3 = y33, Y4 = y42;
X1 = x11, X2 = x22, X3 = x32; M1 = m11 , M2 = m21, M3 = m31 , M4 = m41; T1 = t11, T2 = t21, T3 = t31]
For the second experiment the parameters were varied with the probability of crossover =
0.4 and the probability of mutation = 0.1. By comparing the best results for each experiment in
Table 27 using the P(MPE) as the comparison metric, this experimental configuration yielded
30% better network solutions due to the population diversity introduced by the increase in the
probability of mutation. The third simulation experiment with the probability of crossover = 0.35
and the probability of mutation = 0.15 did not show much improvement in the quality of the
solutions implying that the best parameter setting had been exceeded.
For COA analysis, the states of the variables for the three experimental configurations in
the simulation were set as follows: The hypothesis variable Y1 was set to state y13 (Insurgent
Control of the Population). Similarly, Y2 = y21 (Sectarian governance structures), Y3 = y32
(Insurgent control of the security space), and Y4 = y41 (Nationalism). The informational variables
were set as follows: X1 = x11, X2 = x23, X3 = x32 , M1 = m12,M2 = m23,M3 = m33 ,M4 = m42, T1 = t12 , T2
= t23 and T3 = t32 . For experiment 1, using the BAMSS-GA, the probability of obtaining an MPE
was 4.227E-05 with the genotype [10002100200000] corresponding to phenotypes: Y1 = y12, Y2 =
y21, Y3 = y31, Y4 = y41; X1 = x13, X2 = x22, X3 = x31; M1 = m11, M2 = m24 , M3 = m31, M4 = m41; T1 = t11,
T2 = t21, T3 = t31 .
For illustration purposes, assume that the following hypotheses are under consideration
by the commander: Y1 = y13 (Insurgent Control of the Population), Y2 = y21 (Sectarian
Governance Structures), Y3 = y32 (Insurgent Control of the Security Space) and Y4 = y41
(Insurgent Nationalism). From the simulation results, considering only the Y1 hypothesis
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variable, the MPE supports Y1 = y12 (breakdown in law and order) and not the initial hypothesis
state y13 (insurgent control of the population). The change in the hypothesis state is supported by
explanatory variables X3 |x32→x31 (Unbounded Battlespace), M1 |m12 →m11 (Insurgent Security
Target Engagement).
For experiment 2, the probability of the MPE is 4.693E-05 with a corresponding
genotype, [10000100000000]. The informational variable changes from X1 = x13 to X1 = x11
meaning the most probable state of the network is to be reached if we consider the insurgent
political operational effect as using Sectarian Identity (X1 = x11) rather than the Legitimacy of
Jihad (X1 = x13). Additionally the tactical effect changes from T3 = t32 (Infrastructure Sabotage)
to T3= t31 (Arson). The commander will therefore have to give more weight to this evidence
variable for detail planning in the form of perhaps increasing force levels in areas where critical
infrastructure such as dams or power stations are located or deploying surplus units. For the third
experiment, the probability of the MPE is 3.672E-05 with a genotype, [10002110000000]. The
evidence variable X3 = x31 (Unbounded Battlespace) changes to X3 = x32 (Techniques, Tactics
and Procedures). In this case a change in the counterinsurgent force tactics may be required to
counteract the insurgents who operate with highly dispersed and decentralized command and
control structures. The commander then, has to consider these changes in the Political
Operational Effects to inform the select hypotheses.
Comparisons of performance gains for BAMSS-GA as compared to BAMSS were
performed using the same experimental setup. Using P(MPE) as the comparison metric, the
results showed that Bayesian Network Inference using BAMSS-GA produced better network
solutions than BAMSS by an order of magnitude (103 ). A direct comparison with BAMSS was
done using network efficiency as the metric. In this case, network efficiency refers to the
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“throughput” or the ability of the model to generate plausible network solutions under the
influence of various variables. For the first experiment, a network efficiency of 85% was
achieved with BAMSS-GA. When the probability of crossover and mutation were varied for the
second experiment, a network efficiency of 95% was realized. Additional variation in the GA
parameters resulted in a network efficiency of 70%.
As per the experimental results, this means that the best configuration for BAMSS-GA is
achieved when the probability of crossover is set to 40% and the probability of mutation is set at
10%. The network view of the computed MPE gives a representation of the network nodes with
evidence set to the state of the solution. The phenotype of this representation is a network with a
global state of the computed posterior probabilities. When new evidence is introduced into the
network, the Bayesian Inference Algorithm is applied and the updated posterior beliefs of the
hypothesis variables or target variables of interest are computed.
6.2 Observations and Conclusions
Belief Updating and Abductive Inference have been demonstrated using a BAMSS
prototype, a sensemaking support tool. Two algorithms were implemented for BAMSS, the
Bayesian Clustering Algorithm for Bayesian Abductive Inference and the Genetic Algorithm to
optimize Abductive Inference in the model. Experimental simulation was used to test BAMSS
and BAMSS-GA using sensemaking vignettes from an asymmetrical battlespace domain. A
summary comparison of the major performance parameters for BAMSS and BAMSS-GA is
presented below.
a) Problem Representation: The clustering algorithm used in BAMSS takes direct probability
values as input without any need for extra data massaging. Some effort is needed to develop
the network topology and populate the conditional probability tables with prior probabilities
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for the parent variables and prior conditionals for the children variables. BAMSS-GA
requires the input data to be encoded in a format that is compatible with GA operators. This
requires additional computational resources to massage the data into GA format before it can
be used as input to the BAMSS model.
b) Computational complexity: BAMSS uses a clustering algorithm, an exact search algorithm
to perform inference in a Bayesian Network. For simple networks, the algorithm does not
consume much computing resources. However, its search becomes limited as the network
grows and more computation time is required. As the network grows, the clustering
algorithm defaults to the use of hierarchical search through a top-down processing to reveal
structures of interest at different levels in its divisive hierarchical clustering process.
Divisive clustering, however, does not produce an optimal solution. Additionally, as the
network complexity increases, inference using the clustering algorithm becomes intractable,
exponentially increasing resource utilization. The space complexity is O(n2 ) because of the
space required for adjacency matrix (where they are n items to cluster). The time complexity
is O(kn2 ) because of there is one iteration for each level in the dendogram hence the matrix
(or subset of it) must be accessed multiple times. BAMSS-GA uses a Genetic Algorithm to
perform inference. GA has a parallel search capability which leads to a fast and efficient
convergence to optimal network solution. Additionally, GAs search from a population of
points and use a coding of the parameter sets as compared to the parameters themselves. GA
can handle networks of varying complexity without significant resource utilization.
c) Quality of network solutions: BAMSS-GA can be configured to output k network solutions
or kMPEs for each simulation run. Additionally, BAMSS-GA output can be configured to
display the best (optimal), average and worst solutions. Without additional significant
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computation, the output of BAMSS cannot be determined to be optimal on any input.
Comparison of performance gains for BAMSS-GA as compared to BAMSS using the
probability of MPE as the comparison metric showed that inference using BAMSS-GA
produced better network solutions by an order of magnitude (103 ).
In order to obtain better solutions for BAMSS, two issues have to be considered: Foremost, an
algorithm for CPT elicitation and computation should be incorporated. A CPT elicitation
requires a considerable input time from the user and if not done right, can lead to outputs with
spurious results. Algorithms with the capacity to filter inadmissible and/or conflicting CPT
expressions have been developed. Inadmissible expressions often result into incompatible
hypotheses or the wrong chains of evidence propagations through the network being output to
the user. Secondly, the use of hybrid exact search algorithms to replace the clustering algorithm
is found to speed up computation and output better and accurate results. Hybrid algorithms will
produce better results than those produced by the clustering algorithm and in the case of some
networks will produce results that are an order of magnitude more precise.
Although the asymmetric battlespace domain has been used for network development
simulation experimentation, BAMSS is a sensemaking support tool and can used for any
problem domain where causal reasoning and Abductive Inference is desired. With appropriately
defined networks, BAMSS can be used for diagnostic assistance in the medical field, fault
detection and isolation in engineering, as well as problem solving and data mining in education.
The Open Source software used in its prototype development creates opportunities for further
tailored development.
BAMSS is a standalone application, currently not hosted on the web server. To run the
tool, the software listed in Table 2 has to be installed and run on the client machine. However,
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the executable BAMSS files are easily portable and are readily available to the user. The only
component of the BAMSS accessible on the web is GeNIe which is used for network
development as described in Chapter 4.
This research represents a successful step in developing a proof of concept sensemaking
support system that combines the qualitative and quantitative approaches of sensemaking with
asymmetric battlespace as the problem domain. The use of Genetic Algorithms for sensemaking
support has not been widely explored. We have demonstrated through experimental simulations
that the use of GA for Abductive Inference can produce better results. This technique is useful
for computational search for changes in a network due to belief revisions.
6.3 Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Future Research in BAMSS
The BAMSS developed in this research is a proof of concept in computational
sensemaking, especially in extracting conditional evidences that support a set of hypotheses.
Prior probabilities and prior conditionals for the BAMSS COA Analysis network were obtained
from existing and historical databases of asymmetric wars in the Middle East. No empirical
validation was performed. Additionally, empirical research needs to be done to test the model
with real world data and military expert assessment. The experimental participants need to be
given representative scenarios, be presented with evidence, and then, select a COA without the
use of BAMSS. In the next iteration, the same participants should be required to use the tool,
compare the COA selection in terms of accuracy (with or without the tool) and time needed to
make the correct inference, and select a COA.
With regards to the BAMSS future development, a lot of software development work still
remains to be done in order to seamlessly integrate the GA and the Bayesian Algorithm. The
most important and immediate tasks to be accomplished are:
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i)

Since BAMSS requires a user to define the Belief Network, an additional task is to
develop the Network module as a standalone application in order to remove the
requirement for expert knowledge needed develop the N.etwork structure.

ii)

A dedicated data parsing and formatting subroutine needs to be developed within the
model to convert the output (posterior) probabilities into a format that is suitable for
genetic algorithm application. The challenge is in developing automatic encoding
functions to convert the Bayesian output (phenotype) to GA input (genotype). This
will significantly increase the BAMSS functionality.

iii)

A GUI front end is needed to support BAMSS. This can include the development of
user manuals, an interactive help menu, and a function to enable the user to create
new data fields.

iv)

A further significant enhancement would be to add functionality to BAMSS so that it
can perform sensitivity analysis automatically to reduce the manual COA selection
from kMPEs

A web version of BAMSS that operates in a client-server model will enhance distributed access
for multiple sensemakers who are distributively co-located or geographically dispersed.
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Appendix A: Description of Insurgent Asymmetric Battlespace Variables
Node Name
Y1

Definition
Resistance and liberation from
foreign occupation.

Y2

Establishment of political
infrastructure to legitimize the
insurgency
Control of the political space by
the insurgent force

Y3

Y4

Promotion of fundamentalist
ideologies

X1

Ethnic and sectarian supremacy
by the insurgent force

X2

Disruption of the ability to carry
out nation building and stability
operations by the
counterinsurgent forces

States (Indicators)
y11: Resistance and liberation- liberate the
country or region from the militarily stronger
occupation force by engaging in asymmetric
warfare
y12: Law and order breakdown-Disruption of
counterinsurgent control of the local security
situation by limiting their ability for military
maneuvers and restricting interaction with
the population in stability and support
operations.
y13: Control of the population- Discouraging
the local population from cooperating with
the counterinsurgents through instability,
chaos, conflict and fear.
y14: Excessive force projection- provoking
excessive raids by the counterinsurgent
forces and use the second order effects of
that action as a strategy for resistance
y21: Sectarian governance structures
y22: Fundamentalist insurgent ideology based
on radical tenets
y31: Political opposition to the ruling regime
y32: Control of the security space
y33: Disruption of civic and governance
processes
y41: Nationalism
y42: Sectarian and inter-faith conflicts by
insurgent groups
y43: The conceptual Islamic state (Caliphate).
x11: Sectarian identity and influence on
insurgent mode of operation
x12: Use of fundamentalist ideologies such as
Salafism as a motivating factor for some
forms of battlespace operations
x13: Legitimacy of the Jihad-jihad used in the
context of armed struggle against nonbelievers.
x21: Local environment and feedback
mechanisms
x22: Operational modularity-modular
operations make it difficult for the rigid
counterinsurgent Techniques, Tactics and
Procedures
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X3

M1

M2

M3

x23:Threat forces, criminal elements and part
time forces
x24: Direct attacks on counterinsurgent forces
to influence the perception of the population
regarding capability
Exploiting the vulnerabilities in
x31: Unbounded battlespace- the forward
the counterinsurgent force
edge of the battlespace is unbounded
structure
introducing a complexity that supports the
insurgents asymmetrical tactics
x32:Techniques, tactics and procedurescoherent but highly dispersed and
decentralized command and control
structures
x33: Intelligence asymmetry- evolving new
tactics that strain or defeat the
counterinsurgent Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (IS&R) assets.
Targeted assassinations and
m11: Security target engagement-attacks on
attacks on counterinsurgent forces military and security leaders considered hard
and institutions
targets.
m12: Political target engagement-attacks on
government officials, political party leaders
and religious leaders.
m13: Symbolic target engagement-Attacking
symbolic or iconic targets that represent the
best opportunities to achieve a desired
reaction in the psychological target
Promotion of sectarian and
m21: Civil war- Instability due to the second
religious violence
order effects of the sectarian and religious
conflict
m22: Sanctuary cities- areas where the local
population is sympathetic to and supportive
of the insurgent objectives
m23: Civilian shelters- Insurgents shelter in
mosques, shrines, and other high value
targets as well as targets with high cultural
impact.
m24: Information operations-use of mass
media and internet to disseminate
information quickly and polarize public
opinion.
Undermining the formation of
m31: Armed militias- formation of militias by
legitimate government structures
the insurgent groups tasked with the
responsibility to provide protection to the
population and ensure law and order in the
regions controlled by insurgents
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M4

Insurgent force projection of
military capability

T1

High level attrition attacks by
Insurgents

T2

Low level attrition attacks by
insurgents

m32: Propaganda warfare- The process of
democratization and nation building is
portrayed as a project of the occupying force
and its implementation as the root cause of
violence
m33: Criminal networks- emergence of
ungovernable areas outside the central
government’s control, smuggling networks,
or tribal or sectarian based militias
m41: Counter maneuver- employing
unconventional means and methods to
prolonging the conflict through a low level
war of attrition
m42: Foreign fighters- Linking national
insurgencies a wider global conflict, pitting
nation states against transnational insurgentterrorist networks.
m43: Force structure- insurgent groups
decentralize and compartmentalize to avoid
presenting an easy massive strike target to
the counterinsurgents.
m44: Informal networks- networks of
informers and sources act as reliable sources
of actionable intelligence on
counterinsurgent maneuvers, targets and
locations.
t11: Civilian suicide bombing- A high priority
targeted action within the military structure
of a number of organized insurgent groups.
t12: Remotely detonated IED- The massive
casualty rate of this tactic makes it highly
popular among insurgent groups.
t13: Rocket propelled grenades: non- line of
sight munitions give insurgents the ability to
attack undetected, a wide target selection and
limited engagement with counterinsurgent
force
t21: Small arms attacks- A combination of
low intensity kinetic effects, kidnappings and
executions, usually of high value targets
t22: Coercive threats- Threats against the
population seen as cooperating with the
counterinsurgent force.
t23: Convoy ambushes- guerilla type ambush
and disperse attacks on soft units such as
lightly armed logistics and personnel
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T3

Critical infrastructure attacks by
insurgents

transport units
t31: Infrastructure sabotage- Sabotage of
critical infrastructure to paralyze the
operations of the government and disrupt
counterinsurgent SASO operations.
t32: Arson- Burning of houses in residential
neighborhoods in a form of “cleansing”
operation. A tactic widely used especially in
the Iraqi Insurgency
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Appendix B: Correlation Analysis of the Posterior Distributions for the Variables of Figure 19

The SAS System
The CORR Procedure

4 Variables: m11 y11 x11 t32
Simple Statistics
Variable N

Mean Std Dev

Sum Minimum Maximum Label

m11

7 0.51429 0.30237 3.60000

0.10000

0.90000 m11

y11

7 0.20143 0.00900 1.41000

0.19000

0.21000 y11

x11

7 0.42714 0.02928 2.99000

0.38000

0.46000 x11

t32

7 0.30429 0.00535 2.13000

0.30000

0.31000 t32

Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 7
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
m11
m11

1.00000

m11

y11

x11

t32

0.97144

0.98438

0.88388

0.0003

<.0001

0.0083

1.00000

0.96715

0.89113

0.0004

0.0071

1.00000

0.83680

y11

0.97144

y11

0.0003

x11

0.98438

0.96715

x11

<.0001

0.0004

t32

0.88388

0.89113

0.83680

t32

0.0083

0.0071

0.0189

0.0189
1.00000
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Appendix C: Correlation Analysis of the Posterior Distributions for the Variables of Figure 20

The SAS System

The CORR Procedure

4 Variables: x33 y22 m11 t21
Simple Statistics
Variable N

Mean Std Dev

Sum Minimum Maximum Label

x33

7 0.51429 0.30237 3.60000

0.10000

0.90000 x33

y22

7 0.39857 0.00378 2.79000

0.39000

0.40000 y22

m11

7 0.45286 0.09394 3.17000

0.35000

0.60000 m11

t21

7 0.40429 0.00787 2.83000

0.39000

0.41000 t21

Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 7
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
x33
x33

1.00000

x33
y22

-0.56250

y22

0.1887

y22

m11

t21

-0.56250

-0.98748

-0.87070

0.1887

<.0001

0.0108

1.00000

0.48284

0.80064

0.2724

0.0305

1.00000

0.79249

m11

-0.98748

0.48284

m11

<.0001

0.2724

t21

-0.87070

0.80064

0.79249

t21

0.0108

0.0305

0.0336

0.0336
1.00000
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Appendix D: Correlation Analysis of the Posterior Distributions for the Variables of Figure 21

The SAS System
The CORR Procedure

4 Variables: t32 x22 y41 m23
Simple Statistics
Variable N

Mean Std Dev

Sum Minimum Maximum Label

t32

7 0.51429 0.30237 3.60000

0.10000

0.90000 t32

x22

7 0.39714 0.00756 2.78000

0.39000

0.41000 x22

y41

7 0.30000

0 2.10000

0.30000

0.30000 y41

m23

7 0.27000 0.00577 1.89000

0.26000

0.28000 m23

Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 7
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
t32
t32

1.00000

t32

x22 y41

m23

-0.92708

.

0.76376

0.0027

.

0.0457

1.00000

.

-0.76376

.

0.0457

x22

-0.92708

x22

0.0027

y41

.

.

.

.

y41

.

.

.

.

m23

0.76376

-0.76376

.

1.00000

m23

0.0457

0.0457

.

